Phenomenal Specificity by Cheng, H-Y
 
PHENOMENAL 
SPECIFICITY 	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  
TONY H. Y. CHENG 	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  

	   3 
Abstract The essay is a study of phenomenal specificity. By ‘phenomenal’ 
here we mean conscious awareness, which needs to be cashed out in detail 
throughout the study. Intuitively, one dimension of phenomenology is along 
with specificity. For example it seems appropriate to say that one’s conscious 
awareness in the middle of the visual field is in some sense more specific than 
the awareness in the periphery under normal circumstances. However, it is 
difficult to characterise the nature of phenomenal specificity in an accurate way. 
This essay seeks to do just that. 
 In the introduction, I set up the discussion by invoking a threefold 
Campbellian framework. Chapter 1 introduces a key notion of the analogue, its 
roots in sciences, and its applications in philosophy. Chapter 2 focuses on the 
major case study – the Sperling iconic memory paradigm – and explains how 
the relevant notion of the analogue can be used to explain phenomenal 
specificity involved in the Sperling case. Chapter 3 discusses functions of 
attention, as it is a crucial element in the Sperling case. Chapter 4 extends the 
project by explaining how visual demonstratives fit into the present picture. 
Finally chapter 5 discusses several directions for future researches. This essay is 
not an attempt to discuss all the issues concerning the Sperling case, but to 
provide a new angle in seeing the issue: most people agree that visual 
phenomenology is in some sense specific, but there are not enough attempts to 
model phenomenal specificity explicitly. On this occasion we use a notion of 
the analogue and related ideas to understand phenomenal specificity and how 
it applies to certain empirical cases. 	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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
The Campbellian Project 
 
0.1 From the Imagistic to the Propositional 
This essay is a study of phenomenal specificity in vision. When we see things, 
there is a sense in which at least some aspects of visual phenomenology or 
awareness are very specific: it is part of educated commonsense that we only 
see things in sharp resolution in a small region of the visual field, but still, the 
thought goes, within that limited region visual phenomenology should be 
highly specific. When one looks at a short word without spontaneously moving 
one’s eyes, one should be able to tell what letters one is looking at, and perhaps 
what typeface is used (perhaps without being able to identify the name of the 
font in question). This essay seeks to provide a deeper understanding of this 
phenomenal specificity in vision. 
 This aim is embedded in a larger project of understanding visual 
knowledge; the Introduction provides an initial characterisation of that project 
and how the study of phenomenal specificity fits in. Vision is a form of 
perception. Visual knowledge is therefore a species of perceptual knowledge, 
‘which is the sort of knowledge that we get about the things around us by 
looking at them, feeling them, tasting them, and so on’ (Dancy 1988: 1). With 
this simple characterisation, the notion of perceptual knowledge is neutral 
between two readings: under the first reading ‘perceptual knowledge’ refers to 
the state of perceiving itself, i.e., perceptual states themselves as knowledge; 
under the second reading, the notion refers to propositional attitudes that base 
	   6 
themselves upon perceptual states, i.e., beliefs formed from and warranted by 
perceptual states. Here the primary focus is the latter, and only about vision. In 
order to understand visual knowledge in this sense, the following elements 
need to be understood as well. First, we need to understand the relevant 
aspects of vision. Vision is so complicated that we have to restrict ourselves to 
the extent that the scope of study is narrow enough to be manageable but at 
the same time still informative enough for further theorising. For our purposes 
here, the two aspects we will need to focus on are the informational format of 
visual states, and how that affects awareness in vision. After this, we need to 
have a parallel investigation of beliefs that immediately derived from vision: we 
need to understand their informational format and how it affects awareness in 
beliefs. Given that the format of seeing and the format of believing are 
different in kind, or so I shall argue, an account of the transition from seeing to 
believing is called for. And finally, how the resulting beliefs can gain entitlements 
for their subjects is crucial for the claim of knowledge. These remarks are 
highly abstract. In order to be more concrete, I will set up the discussion by 
situating it into John Campbell’s agenda, which involves three steps. Each 
section of this introduction corresponds to one step. 
 The first step is from the imagistic to the propositional. This is the 
transition from vision to belief. In his ‘Sense, Reference and Selective 
Attention’ (1997), Campbell writes: 
 
The idea that there is a distinction between propositional and imagistic 
content is familiar and compelling, but it brings with it a problem. The 
problem is to explain the relation between the two types of content. 
(55) 
 
The idea is roughly this. It seem plausible, at least on the face of it, that vision’s 
format is imagistic. In Campbell’s formulation, what is imagistic in vision is its 
content. In the text he does not specify whether he means representational content 
as standardly understood in philosophy, but given that in the same context he 
talks about propositional content of beliefs, and propositional content is certainly 
representational, we can assume for the time being that he means 
representational content as well when he talks about imagistic content in vision. 
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However, in pursuing our project we can stay neutral about the issue whether 
vision involves representational content. Even if the answer is negative, there 
can still be two interesting senses in which vision is imagistic. First, vision 
understood as information processing can be imagistic in that the format of 
information is imagistic. The first half of Chapter 1 will be an attempt to cash 
out this idea. Secondly, vision’s phenomenal aspect can be imagistic as well. 
The second half of Chapter 1 and then Chapter 2 will pursue this idea further. 
Now, no matter which sense of imagistic we have in mind, it should be clear 
that many beliefs, unlike vision, are not imagistic. Instead, it is often claimed 
that they have propositional structure. There has been different ways proposed 
by philosophers to understand this structure. In Campbell’s own 
understanding, this kind of content ‘is content with subject-predicate structure, 
in which general terms are coupled with singular terms’ (ibid., 56). This is a 
version of Fregean conception of proposition (Burge 1991). Competing theories 
include Russellian conception that takes properties and objects and 
constituents of content (Tye 1995, 2000), and possible-world conception that 
uses a set of possible worlds to understand propositional content (Stalnaker 
1984, Lewis 1986). We do not take side at this point. What is crucial for us 
here is to recognise that no matter how we understand proposition, it looks 
very different from imagistic content or information. So far we have not 
provided any argument to the effect that being imagistic is incompatible with 
being propositional, but at least on the face of it they seem to have very 
different properties. Hence the challenge.1 
 Campbell’s own solution to this challenge ‘is [to argue] that the primary 
mechanism for mediating between propositional and imagistic content is 
perceptual attention’ (55; my emphasis). I agree with this general view, and will 
pursue it in Chapter 3. Now I turn to the second step of the Campbellian 
agenda. 
 
0.2 From the Subliminal to the Phenomenal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Some philosophers have discussed the possibility of thinking with images, for example 
Michael Ayers’s book on Locke (1993) and Peter Geach’s discussion of Wittgenstein (1957). 
We should not deny that sometimes we think with images, for example when we try to figure 
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Above I alluded to the two senses in which vision can be imagistic. Both 
senses are very important for anyone who wants to have a thoroughgoing 
understanding of vision because the subliminal information processing aspect 
of vision is what sustains our visual cognitive abilities, and because the 
phenomenal aspect of vision is so essential to our mental lives. Vision science 
by and large concerns the former, while philosophical views about vision 
mostly concern the latter. Now there can be two competing conceptions of 
how science and philosophy interact here. On the one hand, we have 
Campbell’s rather optimistic view, which is nicely captured by M. G. F. Martin: 
 
[Campbell] suggests a way in which we can understand our experience 
of the world not simply as a consequence of such information 
processing, but really constituted out of it. (1997: 76; my emphasis) 
 
On the other hand, we have Martin’s own pessimistic view that ‘it is difficult to 
see how we can move beyond the shallow conception of experience we can 
form through introspection and find it in the structures that Campbell draws 
from cognitive psychology’ (ibid.: 76-7). In a way, this essay can be understood 
as a partial answer to this question, namely: how do information and 
phenomenology fit together? The fuller shape of it will be clearer in due course. 
For now let’s stay neutral between these two views, and I shall now explain the 
distinction between subliminal and phenomenal perception. 
 The distinction between subliminal and phenomenal or conscious 
perception is a well-established one in psychology. In most cases philosophers 
agree with it too.2 Often cited evidence includes masked priming, residual 
discrimination in blindsight, and so on. In the case of priming, although 
participants would only be aware of the target, not the earlier stimulus, that 
earlier stimulus would nevertheless guide participants’ decisions. For example, 
if the task is colour detection, when the earlier stimulus is congruent with the 
target, it facilitates the responses (i.e., reaction time becomes shorter). With 
blindsight patients, we can press them to give answers with forced choice 
paradigm with certain kind of targets (i.e., colours might not be appropriate in 
most cases). In these cases, some might want to argue that given their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For an exception, see Phillips (in preparation). 
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definition of perception, masked priming and/or blindsight do not qualify as 
perception. For example, if one holds that perception must exemplify a certain 
sort of constancy (Burge 2010), then perhaps masked priming and blindsight 
would not qualify as perception, even subliminal perception, since in these 
cases participants’ access to targets are too weak or not robust enough in some 
sense. Here I will not propose a definition of perception myself, and I am not 
going to argue against any definition from others. If given certain definition 
masked priming, blindsight, and other cases do not count as perception, call 
them registration or other deflationary names. The overall argumentation in what 
follows would not hinge on the idea that in masked priming and so on we are 
entitled to say that genuine perceptions are going on. 
 Even apart from whether we can say that blindsight is a form of 
perception, we can ask a related question in this case, namely ‘about the role of 
consciousness in our psychological lives’ (Campbell 2004: 265). Campbell first 
identifies a very strong view: ‘the results from neuropsychological cases seem 
to show people finding out their surroundings on the basis of perception, and 
moving and acting successfully in their environments, without the benefit of 
experience of their surroundings’ (ibid.: 265). This seems to be too strong because in 
cases such as blindsight what patients can do through those perceptions (if any) 
is very limited. Maybe in hypothetical cases such as ‘superblindsight’ (Block 
1995a), in which subjects can readily prompt themselves to act on sparse 
information they gather, we can derive stronger conclusions like the current 
one, but real pathological cases fall short of those outlandish outcomes. By 
contrast, there is another view that he calls the ‘how-to-do-it’ conception, on 
which 
 
[I]t is experience of the world that makes it possible for us to have 
knowledge of our surroundings, and to move and act in the world. On 
this picture, if you want to catch a cricket ball, for example, all the 
information you need to do that – the direction and distance of the ball, 
how fast it is moving, and so on – are provided in the content of your 
conscious experience. (Campbell 2004: 265). 
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I find it easier to simply call this the ‘commonsense picture,’ and Campbell 
agrees with that this view is a commonsensical one, though he believes it is 
false. He also believes that the strong, revisionary view he derives from the 
blindsight case is incorrect; he uses these two incorrect views (by his light) to 
set up the dialectic, and provides his own alternative. We will revisit this issue 
in later chapters, for example when we discuss David Rosenthal’s view on 
rationality and consciousness (2008). For now I just want to emphasise that 
there are issues we need to deal with concerning the distinction between the 
subliminal and the phenomenal, and cases such as blindsight might help at 
certain points. 
 
0.3 From the Doxastic to the Rational 
The third step in this Campbellian project concerns the transition from belief, 
a paradigmatic doxastic state, to knowledge. The relation between belief and 
knowledge has proven to be much more complicated than many of us think 
because of Gettier cases and various responses to it. On this occasion I do not 
ambitiously aim at contributing to this thorny problem. What I need is this 
minimal claim: entitlement is required by the claim of knowledge. Entitlement is 
a manifestation of rationality, and it is a crucial component of knowledge. This 
claim is silent about whether we can decompose knowledge into belief and 
other elements, or whether we should take belief to be more primary/primitive 
than knowledge in our theories. What we only need is the idea that belief 
formation itself is not enough for knowledge; after all, it is belief formation, not 
knowledge formation. In order to form knowledge, we need some more 
elements; more specifically, some rational elements. 
 Campbell recently (2011) takes up this issue by revisiting a distinction 
he made in Reference and Consciousness (2002), the distinction between selection and 
access. He points out that in recent philosophical literature many have tied 
attention to access (2011: 323), while he wants to ‘draw a distinction between 
two different aspects of attention and between two different roles a perceived 
property can play in attention’ (ibid.: 323-4). His conceptual resources have 
always been Anne Treisman’s feature map theory (1988), but in this recent 
paper he situates his view in another framework, the one provided by the 
Boolean map theory by Liqiang Huang and Hal Pashler (2007). Pace Huang and 
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Pashler, however, Campbell argues that ‘we should connect visual experience, 
rather, to the properties on the basis of which regions or objects are selected’ 
(2011: 329; my emphasis). We will revisit this view in Chapter 3. In this section 
my purpose is to illustrate how this discussion bears on rationality and 
knowledge. 
 To make this link, the crucial notion is ‘access.’ Campbell here uses the 
definition from Huang and Pashler. He rephrases it like this: 
 
[Access is] a matter of attaching ‘feature labels’ to the selected (possibly 
discontinuous) region. Access and labeling are the same thing; to access 
a feature of a region is to label that dimension (color, shape or 
whatever) of the region. (ibid.: 327) 
 
To illustrate this notion of access and its contrast with selection, Campbell 
elaborates this following example: 
 
Consider a child, at this stage of development [2-year old], looking at 
the kind of display often used to test for color-blindness – a green 5, 
say, showing against a background of red blobs, with the blobs 
constituting the 5 differing randomly from each other and from the 
blobs constituting the background in luminance, in shape, and in every 
other characteristic except hue…If the child does have ordinary color 
vision, then the 5 will be plainly perceptible. (ibid.: 331) 
 
Now the crucial point is that ‘[w]hether the child can see the 5 is one thing. 
Whether the child is able to access the color of the object is another’ (ibid.: 
331). This is because the child may have no relevant colour vocabularies, and 
therefore cannot make inferences about colours. Now, this looks very similar 
to Ned Block’s definition of access that involves ‘direct rational control of 
action and speech’ (1995a/2007a: 168). This rationalist line of definition is 
helpful for the purpose here because in order to take it as a bridge to 
knowledge, it has to be substantively related to rationality. As Block 
emphasises, ‘there are many notions of [access or accessibility] with utility for 
different purposes’ (1995b/2007a: 238). For the purpose of epistemology, we 
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need one that involves rationality, though we should acknowledge that other 
notions of access could be stipulated for other theoretical purposes. Campbell 
also notes this point by saying that others can have a deflationary notion of 
access defined in terms of information reception (2011: 332), but in order to 
do the epistemic work we have in mind, something like Campbell’s or Block’s 
definition is more apt.3 
 In making this distinction, Campbell (like Block) dissociates 
experiences from access in the sense we introduced above, and therefore needs 
to explain how experiences can play any rational role at all in knowledge 
formation. I shall briefly return to this in Chapter 4 and Conclusion. In this 
section I just aim at setting up the discussion with the Campbellian agenda. 
Now before ending the Introduction, I would like to to make a methodological 
remark. Despite the fact that I have set up this discussion with Campbell’s 
framework, and I will return to his positive account in details in due course, 
this essay is not a contribution to Campbell scholarship. I invoke his 
framework because it nicely highlights most crucial elements in the larger 
project I am interested in; that is, visual knowledge. In gaining visual 
knowledge, vision and visual experience need to be in place first. They seem to 
be imagistic in format. If so, we need to explain the nature of this format, and 
how it relates the other format that governs beliefs. There is a related question 
concerning the relation between vision and visual experience, so we need to 
understand the distinction between the subliminal and the phenomenal. Finally, 
when we have relevant visual beliefs in place, we still need to account for a 
further rational element that makes belief knowledge. This is where the notion 
of access comes in. This overall territory constitutes the larger project in the 
background. Campbell’s works from the 90s cover this ground in a 
comprehensive way. In what follows I will discuss his view, and when needed, 
disagree with it. But the purpose is not to provide a review of his philosophy. 
Along the way other thinkers’ ideas will be discussed when appropriate, but the 
overall aim of this study is to understand the nature of phenomenal specificity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 In a previous draft of this material, I invoked a much weaker notion of access that is similar 
to what Campbell means by ‘selection.’ Paul Snowdon reminds me that if I want the notion I 
am using to provide the link to epistemology, I need something much stronger than that. As a 
result the notion provided by Campbell and by Block proves to be useful. Also, in this way my 
usage of the term is closer to the orthodoxy usage, which facilitates communication as well. 
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as an element of visual knowledge, not a thoroughgoing study of certain 
thinker’s views. 
 Finally, let me provide an overview of this essay. In this introduction I 
have reconstructed a framework from some of Campbell’s works. In the main 
body of this essay I will discuss some cases that help us understand 
phenomenal specificity, but the classic Sperling partial report iconic memory 
paradigm (1960) will be central. This case will be introduced in Chapter 2. 
Some preparatory works for understanding it will be offered in Chapter 1, 
where I will discuss notions of the analogue and use one of them, developed 
from Christopher Peacocke (1986, 1989), to cash out the imagistic nature of 
vision. In the Sperling paradigm the key is to understand the relation between 
visual phenomenology, on the one hand, and attention, on the other. Chapter 1 
and 2 will be my attempt to understand the former, while Chapter 3 is devoted 
to the latter. Chapter 4 explores related issues concerning visual 
demonstratives and the grain of vision. In the Conclusion I tight up some 
loose ends and discuss some future directions. In omitting many details in this 
overview, I hope the general scaffolding is clear and sensible. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
 
The Analogue Character of Vision 
 
1.1 Information and Analogue in Sciences 
In the previous chapter, I introduced the idea that from vision to visual 
knowledge there are several transitions. The first one is from the imagistic to 
the propositional. The imagistic refers to the idea that at least on the face of it, 
vision and visual awareness present us the scene in imagistic ways.4 This 
chapter is an attempt to elaborate the sense in which vision and visual 
experience are imagistic. What really concerns us, however, is visual experience. 
In Chapter 2 we will invoke the material here to investigate the nature of 
phenomenal specificity in vision. For now, what is crucial here is a notion of 
the analogue: this is only a notion, since like ‘access’ or perhaps many 
vocabularies in theorising, it is not realistic to claim that one’s notion is the 
notion. At most, one may claim that one notion is the notion to adopt given a 
specific purpose. But even that might be too strong, since with a specific 
purpose maybe more than one notion of the analogue (say) are helpful. In any 
case, here I will rely on a notion of the analogue introduced by Christopher 
Peacocke (1986, 1989). That said, other notions of the analogue are related, 
and it is helpful to understand their roots so that we can have a better grip of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Here I talk about both vision and visual experience, which involves another transition. One 
might argue that since I say ‘on the face of it,’ in this context I must be referring to 
phenomenological reflection, but if so I am entitled only to talk about visual experience in this 
way. However, I do mean to include subliminal vision in this context. This is because we can 
also say that unconscious vision is, on the face of it, imagistic from the point of view of 
artificial intelligence: if one is building a simple robot which will presumably not be conscious, 
one would still do this by implementing imagistic representations. 
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the discussion. In this section I discuss just very briefly some preliminary 
understandings of the analogue and relatedly information in sciences, and 
move to the philosophical literature on them in section 2. Finally I will discuss 
Peacocke’s notion and relate it to the overall project here in section 3. 
 ‘Analogue’ in this context is a way of coding information. Information 
has become a crucial notion in many domains, and it is hard to find a single, 
satisfying definition of it. For our purposes, it is instructive to look at some 
account that aims at a comprehensive understanding of information. 
According to Juan Roederer (2003), the most striking property of information 
is ‘to cause specific changes in the structure and energy flows of a complex 
system, without the information in itself representing fields, forces or energy in 
any of their characteristic forms’ (3). But information does not confine itself 
within the physical realm. It also plays critical roles in biology and Darwinian 
evolution. It further goes up to the psychological realm. In computer science, 
information consists of data understood syntactically, for example the 0s and 
1s in many programmes. So understood, data can be encoded, stored, 
processed, and transmitted. Amongst data, there can be two formats that are 
different in kind. Standardly, analogue data vary continuously, while digital data 
vary discretely. This way of understanding the analogue/digital distinction has 
been challenged by some works in philosophy, which will be considered in 
section 2. Here I tentatively work with this initial understanding. A classic 
statement of this idea is from Alan Turing: 
 
The digital computers…may be classified amongst the ‘discrete state 
machines.’ These are the machines which move by sudden jumps or 
clicks from one quite definite state to another. These states are 
sufficiently different for the possibility of confusion between them to 
be ignored. Strictly speaking there are no such machines. Everything 
really moves continuously. But there are many kinds of machine, which 
can profitably be thought of as being discrete state machines. (Turing 
1950: 439) 
 
The Turing machine itself, as a logically idealised model of normal personal 
computers, is a digital computer. Digital data are binary because they are 
	   16 
typically encoded by only two symbols, for example 0s and 1s. Analogue 
computation, by contrast, operates in real time, and often process in imprecise 
ways. From this we can see the initial motivation of using the analogue to 
understand vision and visual experience, which are imprecise by their very 
nature. More about this will be discussed when we move to Peacocke in 
section 3. Before moving on, I discuss how the notion of information has been 
used in psychology. 
 Around the time Turing was writing, the concept of information arose 
from communication theory (Shannon and Weaver 1949). It is a mathematical 
or quantitative notion in that signals can carry different amounts of 
information. To understand more about it, we need the notion of uncertainty. 
When one tosses a coin, the statement ‘it will be either heads or tails’ is 
uninformative because the knowledge of this statement does not reduce the 
uncertainty concerning what would happen concerning this coin (Fitts and 
Posner 1973). The degree of uncertainty negatively correlates with the amount 
of potential information. If we know that it would be heads, the degree of 
uncertainty is greatly reduced and we gain substantive information. 
Subsequently, psychologists such as Donald Broadbent take themselves as 
understanding the transmission of information in the nervous system. When a 
stimulus always gives rise to the same response, we can say that information is 
maximal. Under this circumstance, there is no uncertainty between the input 
(i.e., stimulus) and the output (i.e., the report). When there are different 
responses, the amount of information is reduced. The amount of information 
can be calculated with factors such as response time. The main strength of this 
approach is that information is something measurable and therefore suitable 
for scientific theorising. 
 The next step is to introduce the notion of redundancy. When we do 
not have maximum information, there is redundancy in the case. Redundancy 
is also negatively correlates with the amount of information. Broadbent (1958) 
further elaborates these ideas into his ‘filter theory.’ This theory has been 
seriously challenged by later accounts, for example the one offered by 
Broadbent’s student Anne Treisman (1960), but for our purposes the further 
development of specific theory is less relevant. What we need is the basic idea 
about how information works in theorising about cognitive systems. The 
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following two sections depart from the basic idea introduced above and offer a 
specific understanding of analogue information. 
 
1.2 Analogue: Philosophical Accounts 
In philosophy, there are two strands in understanding the distinction between 
the digital and the analogue. Let’s start with the one that is more in line with 
the above discussion. The representative of this view is from Nelson 
Goodman: 
 
Plainly, a digital system has nothing special to do with digits, or an 
analog system with analogy…Since the misleading traditional terms 
‘analog’ and ‘digital’ are unlikely to be discarded, perhaps the best 
course is to try to dissociate them from analogy and digits and a good 
deal of loose talk, and distinguish them in terms of density and 
differentiation – though these are not opposites. (1968: 160; my emphasis) 
 
This is similar to the understanding in section 1 because ‘differentiated’ roughly 
means ‘discrete.’ Even nowadays this understanding is still dominant in 
computer science; for example in ‘analogue electronics’ people use analogue to 
refer to electronic systems that are analysed with continuous variables. 
Goodman usefully explains his view by saying that ‘digital’ and ‘analogue’ in his 
usage should not be taken to be connected to their cognates ‘digit’ and ‘analogy.’ 
As we will see presently, this clearly marks the difference between this view 
and its opponent.5 
 David Lewis (1971) offers an alternative account that ‘[takes] issue with 
the claim that digital systems have nothing to do with digits, and that analog 
systems have nothing to do with analogy’ (Maley 2010: 119). In this sense, this 
view is closer to another root of the analogue/digital distinction, the one from 
cognitive science on mental imagery. In this debate, the crucial disagreement is 
about whether mental imagery and rotation are analogue or propositional 
(Pylyshyn 1981; Kosslyn 1981). This should remind us of the first transition in 
the Campbellian agenda, i.e., from the imagistic to the propositional, which we 
are investigating at this stage. So at least for this reason, this second tradition 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 John Haugeland (1981) offers another version in this vein. 
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fits our purpose better. Recently Corey Maley (2011) proposes a more 
ambitious project that seeks to unify the two understandings for his purpose; 
here my aim is much more moderate. What I need here is an understanding 
that helps us model vision and visual experience. Below are some general 
understanding of the distinction between the analogue and the digital in terms 
of digit and analogy. 
 In this line of thought, to say that we can use A as an analogue device 
to measure B is to say that we invoke an analogy between A and B. Any analogy 
is to draw similarity comparison along certain dimension; consider the example 
in which we use a bar to measure the width of a window. When the bar we are 
using is longer than the width of the window, we make a mark on the bar 
where the window ends. In doing this we do not use any unit: nothing like inch 
or centimeter is involved. But if we want to make the measurement easier to 
communicate, we may introduce units in the bar. Thus the bar becomes a ruler, 
a digital device. It is digital because we can use it to ask discrete yes/no 
questions, for example whether the width of the window is 20 inches or not. 
This brings us to a related idea from Peacocke that we see things in a unit-free 
way (1986: 2; 1989: 300): we do not see things with units such as inches and 
centimeters. To be sure, this phenomenological point cannot rule out the 
possibility that we do see things with mental units without being aware of them, 
but at least it provides a prima facie reason to start with the assumption that 
seeing is unit-free. Again I postpone my discussion of Peacocke until section 3. 
 One way to understand the significance of all these is the following. It 
seems relatively unproblematic to say that beliefs are digital, because we 
evaluate them with truth, which is binary under normal understanding. 
Vagueness aside, beliefs are like assertion in that they can be true or false but 
no third value. Sometimes we say an assertion is roughly or approximately true, 
but that means that it is strictly speaking false. For example when we check 
time we say ‘it’s five past noon,’ but very often it is strictly speaking false, even 
in cases that the clock is accurate. Assuming this is the correct way to 
understand belief, then there is a question about whether we should model 
perception, in our case vision, in the same way. But here we have pressure 
from both sides. On the one hand, in order to account for the rational linkages 
between seeing and believing, it seems easier if seeing is digital as well; on the 
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other hand, there are other reasons, notably phenomenological ones, that lead 
us to think that seeing is analogue. For those who holds any kind of analogue 
account, one needs to explain more about this analogue nature and how it can 
accommodate the rational linkages between seeing and believing. Another 
challenge is to explain how we can present determinant length/interval without 
using units. To this Peacocke’s solution is to introduce what he calls ‘manner’ 
(1986: 5; 1989: 303). Notice that since ‘digital’ in this context is a semantic 
notion as it is related to truth, correspondingly ‘analogue’ here should be 
understood in semantic terms as well. Here again we depart from the definition 
prominent in computer science, where the distinction between the analogue 
and the digital is a syntactic one. 
 Before turning to Peacocke, it would be very helpful to discuss Fred 
Dretske’s discussion of relevant matter. In Knowledge and the Flow of information 
(1981), Dretske takes up virtually all the challenges we set up in the 
introduction. He has an understanding of the analogue/digital distinction that 
is designed to account for the transition from the imagistic to the propositional. 
He also provides an account of belief and knowledge that corresponds to the 
transition from the doxastic to the rational. Although the transition from the 
subliminal to the phenomenal is less obvious in this work, he comes back to it 
in his more recent works (e.g., 2006). Just like our discussion of Campbell, this 
essay is not supposed to be a contribution to Dretske (or any other 
philosophers) scholarship; it instead seeks to aid our understanding by 
discussing their ideas sometimes in details, sometimes with broader outlooks. 
 Dretske starts by distancing himself from the first strand in 
understanding the analogue/digital distinction; that is, ‘to think of the 
difference between an analog and a digital encoding of information as the 
difference between a continuous and a discrete representation of some variable 
property at the source’ (1981: 135-6; my emphasis). Like the discussion above, 
he does not argue against this strand of understanding; he provides a different 
understanding because it fits the purpose of understanding the transition from 
the imagistic to the propositional (in my terms). His definition is this: 
 
I will say that a signal (structure, event, state) carries the information 
that s is F in digital form if and only if the signal carries no additional 
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information about s, no information that is not already nested in s’s 
being F. If the signal does carry additional information about s, 
information that is not nested in s’s being F, then I shall say that the 
signal carries this information in analog form. (ibid.: 137) 
 
Take Dretske’s own example. Suppose we have a statement saying that ‘the 
cup has coffee in it’; this statement by itself does not communicate how much 
coffee there is in that cup, or how the cup looks like. This is why statement is 
said to be encoded in digital form. By contrast, if we take a photograph of the 
situation, the information about the quantity of coffee and the properties of 
the cup will be included as well, even though that might not be the purpose of 
that specific communication. This example also shows the relevance of this 
understanding of the analogue/digital distinction to the transition from the 
imagistic to the propositional: it is no accident that the example involves a 
statement and a photograph; their difference is exactly what Dretske attempts 
to capture here. 
 Let’s proceed to see how Dretske invokes this pair of notions to 
account for the transition from the imagistic to the digital. Again with use 
Dretske’s own example. He invites us to ‘consider the following simple 
mechanism’: 
 
A variable source is capable of assuming 100 different values. 
Information about this source is fed into an information-processing 
system. The first stage of this system contains a device that accurately 
registers the state of the source. The reader may think of the source as 
the speed of a vehicle (capable of going from 0 to 99 mph), and the 
first stage of our information-processing system as a speedometer 
capable of registering (in its mobile pointer) the vehicle’s speed. This 
information is then fed into a converter. The converter consists of four 
differently pitched tones, and a mechanism for activating these 
different tones. If the source is in the range 0 to 14, the lowest-pitched 
tone is heard. A higher-pitched tone occurs in the range 15 to 24, a still 
higher pitch from 25 to 49, and the highest at 50 to 99. (1981: 139-40) 
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This mechanism can be represented with this figure: 
 
 
Figure 1. From Dretske 1981 
 
First thing to be noted is that at the first stage it involves several ranges; that is 
because at a later stage those ranges would correspond to individual signals, in 
this case different pitches. As Dretske points out, there would always be loss of 
information (ibid.: 140-1). Consider again the photograph and the statement. 
When we have the photograph before us, we can write several statements 
about it. Every statement picks out a specific aspect of the photograph, e.g., 
the fact that there is coffee in the cup, the quantity of coffee, the colour of the 
cup, and so on. We can of course use conjunctions to connect individual 
statements so that in the end the information encoded in the long statement is 
almost as much as the information encoded in the photograph. But here we 
need to note two points. First, even assuming that quantitatively speaking, the 
information carried by the long statement is exactly the same as the 
information carried by the photograph, the formats are still different: in the 
photograph, parts of it draw similarity comparison along certain dimension 
with the scene, while in the long statements we have to use different 
components, notably conjunctions. Secondly, since we are using this model to 
understand seeing and believing, we should remind ourselves that realistically 
beliefs never involve too many conjunctions. What we are modeling are human 
psychological states, so what we say here has to be psychologically real. Even 
apart from the first problem, realistically speaking the outputs, i.e., beliefs, 
would definitely loss information. This is the nature of the transition from the 
imagistic to the propositional. Dretske’s model gives us a good starting point in 
this project. 
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 However, there are at least two reasons to move beyond Dretske’s 
picture. First, consider this objection from Peacocke: 
 
[H]is actual definition of the distinction, however, relates not to the 
form in which the information is carried, but to the degree of 
specificity of the information carried by a state relative to the most 
specific information carried by the state…Dretske’s definition captures 
neither a distinctive type of content, nor a distinctive type of form in 
which the information is carried. (1989: 315) 
 
Peacocke’s objection seems to be this. What we want to capture about the 
distinction between the digital and the analogue is their difference in format, 
but what Dretske’s offers does not succeed in doing this. Instead, it points to 
the degree of specificity. This is unsatisfying because the digital and the analogue 
should constitute a dichotomy, which is exactly not a gradational notion. 
Consider this following example. Newspapers should be understood as 
conveying information in the digital form (unlike photos), but with Dretske’s 
definition it might be able to conceive newspapers as an analogue device, since 
newspapers’ reports can sometimes carry additional information about the 
target. So even if Dretske’s relevant discussion is insightful, the definition itself 
is not satisfying. 
 Secondly, in his example involving the photograph, Dretske does not 
directly discuss vision and especially visual experience. This is not his project in 
that particular work (1981). This brings us to Peacocke’s work, which explicitly 
sets itself to characterise vision and visual experience when using the 
distinction between the analogue and the digital. 
 
1.3 Peacocke on Analogue and Matching Profile 
Peacocke’s works on analogue content in the 80s are seldom discussed by 
other philosophers. This is so not only because it is conceptually very dense, 
but also due to the fact that it was soon replaced by a similar and related 
debate, i.e., the one between nonconceptual and conceptual content. We 
should not, however, conflate these two issues, for the simple reason that the 
distinction between the analogue and the digital does not map onto the 
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distinction between the nonconceptual and the conceptual: digital computers 
are not conceptual devices, unless one has a fancy conception of the conceptual, 
for example. Perhaps most philosophers do not commit to this conflation, but 
in any case the earlier discussion of the analogue and the digital is largely 
forgotten from the 90s until now. Even Peacocke himself puts more emphasis 
on nonconceptual content in A Study of Concept (1992), shortly after his 
elaborates an account of analogue in 1989. To be fair, even in the 80s Peacocke 
has already discussed nonconceptual content, but at least as a sociological fact 
the discussion of the analogue almost disappears in the literature from the 90s. 
In any case, in what follows I will revisit and develop his account in the 80s 
and try to show that the account provides us a good direction towards 
understanding the nature of vision and visual experience. 
 Peacocke’s theorisation proceeds on the assumption that perceptual 
states exemplify representational content. For example he says at the beginning of 
the chapter on perceptual concepts in A Study of Concepts: ‘A perceptual 
experience represents the world as being a certain way’ (1992: 61; my emphasis). 
Similar staring point is operative in earlier works (1986, 1989). For our 
purposes we can abstract this assumption away. To see how this is possible, 
consider how psychologists understand the following notions in this area – just 
noticeable difference, discriminability, and visual acuity. When they conduct 
experiments and write discussions on them, there is no need to assume 
representational content in philosopher’s sense. Notions of representation do 
flow around in psychology, but none of them is obviously identical to 
philosopher’s usage. To be sure, there is a possibility that when we remove the 
assumption we might lose what Peacocke means at some point, but as an initial 
move it seems fine given that the subject matters do not obviously hinge on 
the idea that perceptual states exemplify representational content. 
 But even if my readers allow me to do so, there would be an immediate 
query: if we bracket the representational assumption, where should we start 
instead? More specifically, Peacocke argues that perceptual experiences are in a 
certain way analogue, and with the representational assumption he can readily 
substantiate the claim by saying that ‘these [analogue] manners of perception 
constitute a genuine level of content in their own right’ (1989: 306; my emphasis). 
If I abstract away the representational assumption, how can I further cash out 
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the claim? What is the property of perception, if not content, that is analogue? 
Here I propose that the property in question is phenomenal character or more 
generally, phenomenology. I will offer two reasons for this. 
 First, consider this line of thought. When two lines are almost the same 
length, average human subjects cannot discriminate between them with respect 
to length. When we adjust the setting, in the present case the lengths, so that 
now average human subjects are able to discriminate them concerning their 
lengths, it means that the length difference between them reaches just noticeable 
difference. This is a fact about our visual acuity, which admits of individual 
differences. Now, it is arguable that in this kind of tasks, average human 
subjects might draw on visual phenomenology to achieve the tasks, or at least, the 
discriminatory capacities shows up sometimes to inform us what is going on. 
This is consistent with the possibility that a phenomenal zombie can have the 
same cognitive achievement without drawing on any phenomenology – like an 
unconscious machine, the zombie can have visual acuity to certain stimuli and 
thereby discriminate between them. However, this consistency does not imply 
that in the case of average human subjects, i.e., ourselves, phenomenology is 
not part of the story in visual acuity tasks; at least, it plays certain (if not crucial) 
role. Or consider a more vivid case of colour phenomenal continuum. Colour 
a is indiscriminable from a’, and a’ is indiscriminable from a’’, but a is 
discriminable from a’’. In doing this, we might draw on our visual 
phenomenology to achieve the tasks, or at least discriminative capacities show 
up in phenomenology. Again an unconscious machine can do this without any 
phenomenology, but this is not relevant. We are interested in our own case, 
and it is arguable that in our case phenomenology plays certain (if not crucial) 
role in achieving these cognitive tasks. Even if we assume epiphenomenalism, 
at least we can say that discrimination manifests in phenomenology sometimes. 
 Secondly, the idea that phenomenology is actually what is at issue fits 
well with Peacocke’s text. At one point he says, ‘[i]ndividuation of the content 
of perception is answerable to considerations of phenomenology in the first 
instance’ (1986: 12; my emphasis). The reason why he concludes that one sort 
of perceptual content is analogue is this above conviction concerning the 
relation between phenomenological considerations and content individuation. 
The main body of his relevant works is all about visual phenomenology, 
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broadly construed. The transition from the phenomenal to the representational 
is not his main point in those works. 
 In redirecting Peacocke’s discussion like this, we touch on the second 
transition in the Campbellian agenda, the one from the subliminal to the 
phenomenal. Here we face a difficult question whether our view would 
collapse into epiphenomenalism, as alluded above, or whether we should insist 
on the causal efficacy of experience, and if so, how. These difficult issues will 
be discussed in later chapters. For now we only need to note that even if we 
concede that phenomenology might be epiphenomenal, at least it is indeed a 
salient part of human mental life (though without relevant causal powers). 
 What do we mean by ‘phenomenology’ then? This is another difficult 
question that can itself be a thesis topic, but since it is one of the central 
notions here, let me make some preliminary comments. In this area, there are 
terminologies that look like they can be used interchangeably but actually not. 
For example, ‘phenomenality’ (Siewert 1998, 2012) implies that it is a property 
(‘ity’), while some philosophers might argue that the experiential aspect of 
vision should be treated as particulars (repeatable) or events (non-repeatable), 
and so on. I intend to use the term ‘phenomenology’ to stay neutral between 
these competing views. One ambiguity is that the word can also be used to 
refer to a branch in philosophy: just like ‘psychology,’ in some cases it means 
individual’s mental life, but in other cases a discipline. However, given the 
present context, it should be very clear that we do not use the term to refer to 
that branch of philosophy. We are talking about an element of the mind, be it 
property, particular, or event. 
 Philosophers very often talk about this aspect of the mind with the 
phrase ‘what it is like for a creature to undergo’ a mental state or episode 
(Nagel 1974). However, in recent year some have pointed out that the phrase 
does not do the theoretical work we want it to do (Williamson 1990/2013). 
Paul Snowdon (2010) has argued that the phrase is not necessary, nor sufficient, 
and not even very informative in picking out our subject matter. I am 
sympathetic with this sceptical line, but want to make a weaker conclusion that 
we can carry on using the terminology as long as we remind ourselves that it 
does not do significant theoretical work for us. It serves as a (defective) way to 
get people’s attention to the phenomenon, but by itself it is not descriptively 
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satisfactory. In what follows we may or may not use the phrase, but even when 
we use it we should treat it from a deflationary point of view. 
 These are only general remarks and qualifications. Let’s go back to 
Peacocke and follow his line of thought more closely so that we can get a 
better understanding of the details. For the ease of exposition, I here follow his 
shorter paper in 1986. 
 In both essays, Peacocke starts with daily examples showing the 
contrast between thinking about length with units like inch and simply seeing 
length. Historical accuracy aside, this is similar to Russell’s distinction between 
knowledge by description and by acquaintance. Here Peacocke mainly relies on 
phenomenological considerations in pushing his point: ‘the notion of distance 
in feet ought not to enter a specification of the content of his experience at all’ 
(1986: 2). This is a phenomenological point because before and after this 
remark there is no explicit argument supporting this conclusion. And I concur 
in this view: even if we see in mental units unconsciously, this does not affect 
the point that from perceiver’s point of view, she simply sees length without 
unit. This consideration leads Peacocke to claim (and I agree) that seeing is 
unit-free. 
 However, as he himself points out, to say seeing is unit-free, by itself, 
does not help us answer the questions he sets out to answer, namely: 
‘questions about the correct formulation of these ways [of seeing], their 
individuation, their internal relations to one another, and what distinguishes 
them as a class’ (ibid.: 2). Before he starts the positive account, he guards 
against a proposal that invokes ‘precise distance experienced’ to account for 
our ways of seeing (ibid.: 3). The reason to deny this is simply because ‘humans 
do not have arbitrary powerful senses’ (ibid.: 3).6 This echoes the idea in 
section 1 that analogue is imprecise. He then uses notions such as 
‘discriminability’ and ‘matching’ (non-discriminable difference) to make the 
argument more explicit. For our purposes I do not enter this negative use of 
these notions here. However the positive use is crucial: they help us construct a 
notion of ‘matching profile’: for direction, the ‘matching profile is a set of 
directions: a given direction is in the set if and only if it is not discriminably 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6In initiating his anti-luminosity argument, Timothy Williamson has a similar starting point: 
‘our powers of discrimination are limited’ (2000: 13). 
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outside the apparent direction of the end of the perceived arm’ (ibid.: 4). 
Similar things can be said about distance, length, and other visible properties. 
The notion of matching profile can capture the ‘subject’s perceptual acuity’ 
(ibid.: 4). Matching profile can accommodate the fact that humans’ powers of 
discriminatory capacities are limited, and relatedly, it can help explain 
veridicality (ibid.: 5): an experience being veridical is a matter of degree. If we 
were to require perfect correspondence between objects’ properties and what 
is presented in experience, then almost no visual experience can be veridical. 
The idea of matching profile takes non-discriminable difference into 
consideration. One way to think about matching profile is to say that it is a set 
that specifies how the world could be given that experience. There are many 
ways the world could be that are compatible with one’s current experience. 
 In order to understand the core of this proposal, we need to focus on 
the contrast between binary valuation and supervaluation. If experience admits of 
binary valuation, then there are two possibilities. Either the world is presented 
in experiences as having absolutely determinate lengths, sizes and so on, and 
the experience is veridical only when that very length or size is present, or the 
world is presented in experiences as falling within some intervals with respect 
to length, size and so on, and experiences present the interval in question as 
exemplified; again here experiences are perfectly veridical or not. There is no 
immediate contradiction within this picture, i.e., the world as presented in 
experiences with binary valuation, but it seems to be in tension with a plausible 
idea that veridicality is a gradational notion. Our experiences are so fleeting that 
if we impose such a strong requirement of veridicality, most of our experiences 
would turn out to be non-veridical, and this is what we should deny. This reply 
is different from a bad reply to scepticism: it is useless to say to the sceptic that 
if your view is correct, then most if not all of our experiences are non-veridical. 
To this the sceptic could simply reply that if that is so, so much the worse for 
us. My reply here is in a better position because in the present context, 
scepticism is out of question. We are assuming the daily conception of the 
world that external world exists independent of being perceived, etc. On this 
basis, we ask the question as to how to understand experiences’ veridicality. In 
this context, ‘veridicality’ is a term we use to refer to usual cases of perception. 
It is almost a semantic point that most experiences are veridical. If this line of 
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thought is correct, then when a view entails the opposite, we then have at least 
one reason to cast doubt on that view. 
 If we drop the idea that binary valuation can capture experiences, 
supervaluation presents itself as a natural alternative. Here we consider a 
number of different ways of presenting, each involving lengths that fall below 
just noticeable difference, and we consider the experience to be presenting some 
property only if each of the ways of presenting are consistent with that 
property. This is where the idea of ‘matching profile’ comes in. It allows for 
the idea that there is something of a degree to the accuracy of experience. Also 
consider the following three cases: experience two lengths as the same, 
experience them not as different, and experience them as different. The middle, 
intermediate case is a common phenomenon that needs to be understood. The 
analogue model here can do the work. If within a given matching profile, then 
one experiences two lengths as the same. If we keep making the objective 
difference bigger, towards a certain point they would reach the boundary of 
matching profile, and at this point one would experience them not as the same 
but also not as different. Subjects are unsure in this case. This is analogous to 
the case of vagueness – say at some point one would be unsure about whether 
a case constitutes a heap or not – and that is why supervaluation can be applied 
here. When the difference gets bigger, one starts to experience the targets as 
different in length. The notion of matching profile and related apparatus can 
be invoked to model the transitions in question. Notice that here I do not 
commit myself to the view that supervaluation is the correct model of 
vagueness. The idea that supervaluation is helpful in understanding perception 
is an independent one. 
 Just to illustrate the idea with another example. Consider two lines with 
similar lengths. One’s visual experience of line A has this matching profile: 
 
 A: {L1, L2, L3, L4} 
 
While the visual experience of line B has this matching profile: 
 
 B: {L4, L5, L6, L7} 
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In this case, even if the two profiles are not identical, given that there is an 
overlap, L4, the subject in question cannot discriminate A from B. When we 
make B a bit longer so that the matching profile of it no longer contains L4, the 
subject becomes able to tell A from B. The better one’s visual acuity is, the 
smaller the matching profile would be. In Chapter 3 I will argue for the thesis 
that attention can narrow down the range of matching profiles and therefore 
enhance one’s visual acuity, but for now what is crucial is to have a grip of the 
idea of matching profile and related notions. One worry about this example 
might be that since I represent the profiles with natural numbers, they look 
discrete and therefore digital. For example, it looks like there can be L2.5 
between L2 and L3. If so, the example is inappropriate for my purposes. But 
this misconstrues the example. The subscripts after L do not represent actual 
lengths. If they were, it would indeed be correct to say that between 2 and 3 
there can be many lengths. But the numbers do not work like this in the 
example. Compare the example in which philosophers talk about time T1 and 
T2. The question about whether there is T1.5 does not even arises because the 
question misconstrues the symbolism. However, to avoid misunderstanding 
perhaps we can represent the matching profiles like this: 
 
 {Li|1<i<5} 
 {Lii|4<ii<8} 
 
In this symbolism, numbers do represent actual lengths (though without 
specified unit), unlike the original way of representing the two matching 
profiles. Now I want to highlight two qualifications. First, nowadays many 
philosophers hold the view that experiences have accuracy conditions that are 
not binary, but the model of understanding how this is so is seldom spelled out. 
Secondly, it is a further claim that these veridicality conditions constitute 
experiences’ contents. Some philosophers have recognised this and offer 
explicit further arguments for the ‘content view’ of experience (e.g., Siegel 2010, 
Schellenberg 2011). Here my project is silent about this further step. 
 It is at this point where Peacocke introduces his notion of ‘manner’ 
(ibid.: 5). It is supposed to capture the experiential aspect of seeing. These 
manners are psychologically real ‘because their individuation supervenes on 
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facts about the matching relations sustained by a subject’s mental states’ (ibid.: 
6). Another point is that manners are modality-general: one can see and hear 
something from the same direction.7 Now the key point is that manners are 
analogue, in the sense we discussed above. The crucial point is that 
‘approximation makes sense only where there is a dimension of variation which 
is covered by the kind of content in question’ (ibid.: 9; my emphasis). By ‘the 
kind of content’ Peacocke means analogue content, and again for our purposes 
we can abstract away from talks about representational content. And 
‘approximation’ refers to the idea that we do not experience things with precise 
distance, directions, and so on. Manners and their analogue nature are 
postulated to explain this psychological fact, amongst other things. 
 After sketching his notion of manner, Peacocke proceeds to argue that 
manner is distinct from both perceptual object and ‘perceptual-demonstrative 
thought constituent (Fregean modes of presentation)’ (ibid.: 9). For the former, 
he uses examples to show that ‘manners of perception of distance [or length] 
are in a many-one relation to the distance [or length] perceived’ (ibid.: 10). I 
believe there is an even easier way to show that manner is distinct from 
perceived object: as Peacocke himself notes, ‘the notion [of manner] has been 
introduced here in the context of the phrase “thing perceived in a particular 
manner”’ (ibid.: 5). This implies that they are distinct by definition. It is like in 
the case of language the referent is distinct from ways we talk about the 
referent. 
 To differentiate manner from Fregean mode of presentation is more 
difficult. Again Peacocke here invokes an example to illustrate the point. 
Suppose one notices that two things ‘match in respect of apparent length’ 
(ibid.: 11). Now let’s stipulate that they are in fact the same length, and also 
perceived in exactly the same manner. For reductio, we also assume that ‘there is 
for each length presented in a given manner a unique demonstrative mode of 
presentation of it of the form “that length”’ (ibid.: 11). Together with other 
stipulations in the example it follows that the modes of presentation ‘that 
length’ with the two perceived objects are identical. But indeed the subject in 
question can be in doubt as to whether the modes of presentation associated 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Peacocke uses the term ‘amodal,’ but it seems to be more appropriate to use ‘modality-
general’ and contrast it with ‘modality-specific.’ 
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with each objects are in fact identical. The statement that ‘that length (in 
relation to one object) and that length (in relation to the other) are the same’ is 
informative. Their modes of presentation are not identical. This contradicts the 
assumption that there is a one-one correspondence between mode of 
presentation and manner. 
 The dialectic here seems to be this: Peacocke holds the view that 
manners are analogue, and in later writings he makes a related claim that they 
are nonconceptual (1998: 381). There he explicitly distinguishes manners from 
Fregean senses associated with demonstrative concept. For this purpose he has 
to argue that manners as he understands them are different from modes of 
presentation.8 
 My preliminary discussion of Peacocke’s view of the analogue nature of 
vision ends here. It will play a significant role in the key case of the thesis, 
namely the Sperling paradigm discussed in Chapter 2. Before leaving this 
chapter I just want to briefly remind ourselves what got us to the present 
direction. In the Campbellian agenda, the first two steps are from the imagistic 
to the propositional and from the subliminal to the phenomenal. Peacocke’s 
discussion is relevant to both. To be analogue is a specific way to be imagistic, 
and with this idea of analogue we will need to come up with an account of the 
first transition. Also, what Peacocke has in mind here is visual phenomenology, 
so we have seen that there is a danger of oscillating between vision in the 
information processing sense and awareness in vision. Chapter 2 will make this 
issue more explicit by considering some interactions between psychological 
experiments and related conceptual issues. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8  At this point Peacocke remarks about the key difference between perception and 
propositional attitudes: ‘there is no reason these different notions must coincide’ (ibid.: 12). It 
is instructive to compare this with McDowellian transcendental argument to the effect that 
they must coincide (1996). But I will leave it here for the time being. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
 
Specific Phenomenology 
 
2.1 Sperling’s Partial Report Paradigm: A Case Study 
So far, we have set up the project with the three transitions offered by 
Campbell (1997, 2004, 2011). In Chapter 1, we invoked a notion of the 
analogue developed by Peacocke (1986, 1989) to understand a way vision can 
be imagistic. However towards the end we reached an ambiguity between 
vision in the information processing sense and visual experience. When 
Dretske discusses the transition from the analogue to the digital, consciousness 
is not involved; both his examples of the photograph and the simple 
mechanism do not involve any kind of experience. When Peacocke develops 
his notion of the analogue, it is explicitly about phenomenology: he invokes 
phenomenological considerations, amongst other things, to motivate the 
postulation of content. Where should we focus, vision or visual experience? 
 There is no easy answer to this question. In order to further investigate 
it, in this chapter we discuss George Sperling’s iconic memory experiment in 
detail. In what follows I describe the experiment first and then offer three 
reasons for bringing it up in the present context. At the beginning of the 
experiments, participants look at a blank screen with a fixation point in the 
middle of the screen. An array of letters constituting a grid then comes in as 
stimuli for 15-500 milliseconds. After the stimuli disappear, there will be a 
delay with a blank screen; the period of delay depends on specific experimental 
settings for different purposes. Then crucially, a cue tone comes in signifying 
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which row the participants are supposed to report (high tone for the high row, 
etc.). Since there is a delay between the stimuli and the cue, one might expect 
that the cue will not have any significant effect, since it comes too late. 
Surprisingly, however, participants are actually very good at reporting the given 
row accurately, even though the cue comes much later than the stimuli. 
 Now why is it appropriate to direct our discussion to this at this stage? 
First, in understanding what is going on in this setting, psychologists have 
drawn a significant distinction between informational and visible persistence 
(Coltheart 1980), and this exactly highlights our issue concerning vision in the 
information processing sense and visual experience (more on this below). 
Secondly, Sperling’s experiment, and other similar cases in psychology, 
epitomise elements we need in understanding visual knowledge, the larger 
project we have in the background. In the experiment it involves both vision 
and visual experience for sure, and participants need to form beliefs for reports. 
Amongst those beliefs some are true beliefs, and amongst those true beliefs 
some constitute knowledge. All of them are what we need in the background 
project. To be sure, in conducting these experiments psychologists do not ask 
the same questions as philosophers do, for example they do not care about the 
epistemic status, such as entitlement, of beliefs. However, we can use those 
experiments to think about issues that interest us as philosophers. Finally, and 
very generally, to anchor philosophical discussions of mind and perception to 
empirical studies might be helpful at least sometimes. The departure of 
psychology from philosophy happened less than 150 years ago, but many 
questions in philosophy of mind and perception are older than that. One major 
virtue of psychology as science is that it attempts to operationalise many 
notions they use, and conduct careful controls as much as possible. This is a 
virtue, but it also has its limit: some real questions can be asked, but maybe 
difficult or even impossible for us to operationalise. This is why towards the 
end of talks or papers in psychology they like to say that from this point they 
are speculating. This is roughly where philosophy takes over. Given this 
continuity, it is a good idea to anchor philosophical thoughts to some carefully 
controlled experiments. To say this is certainly not to claim that every question 
in philosophy of mind and perception has to be dealt with in this fashion. This 
method is useful only when the issues in philosophy in question are close 
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enough to some extant experimental settings. This needs to be handled with 
care in a case-by-case manner. Also, this idea is different from the problematic 
thought that psychology in particular and science in general can solve our 
philosophical puzzles. This is a much stronger and also unwarranted claim. 
Psychology has become more and more successful after departing from 
philosophy, and there are good reasons for this. To think that science can 
solve our philosophical puzzles is an overly optimistic fantasy. The third 
reason I provided here is much weaker than this problematic claim. 
 So much for methodological considerations. Now we will discuss the 
distinction between informational and visible persistence, and why it is relevant 
to our project. Recall that we set out to understand the imagistic nature of 
vision and visual experience, and in Chapter 1 I suggested that Peacocke’s 
notion of analogue content is helpful in this regard. Now in the context of 
understanding Sperling’s paradigm, the notion we need to understand is 
Block’s notion of specific phenomenology. The distinction between generic and 
specific phenomenology first appears in the reply Block makes to his various 
opponents (2007c). As he emphasises, this distinction is ‘crucial in the 
overflow argument’ (531). Here I aim at understanding this pair of notions and 
examining whether it supports Block’s conclusion. 
 Psychologists have attempted to understand the Sperling in the past 
few decades. First of all, Ulric Neisser (1967) argues that the visual sensory 
memory involved is iconic in character. A further distinction between visible and 
informational persistence is made later by Max Coltheart (1980). According to a 
common understanding of Block’s agenda, his argumentation comes in at this 
point, namely that in the Sperling paradigm, there is not only informational but 
also visible persistence. Call this the VISIBLE thesis. And his major opponents 
deny the further claim about visible persistence. This understanding is neat, but 
I will argue that it is incorrect. Let me explain. Coltheart (1980) argues that 
Sperling’s case is only about informational persistence (see also Di Lollo 1980), 
and it has been further argued that while visible persistence is negatively 
correlated with stimulus duration, informational persistence is positively 
correlated with stimulus duration (Greene 2007). Also, techniques such as 
‘duration of stimulus technique’ (Long 1980) and ‘moving slit technique’ 
(Haber and Standing 1970) are designed to test visible but not informational 
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persistence. If this standard conception is correct – namely that Sperling’s 
paradigm concerns informational persistence only, and visible persistence is a 
fundamentally different phenomenon – then Block’s contention is simply false: 
one view is the negation of the other. However, Block does not argue against 
this standard conception: when he discusses Coltheart (1980) and Di Lollo 
(1980), he cites them with approval (2007b: 490, 494). Something must have 
gone wrong here. Now consider Block’s summary of the locus of the 
disagreement: 
 
There have to be such specific representations given that any location 
can be cued with high accuracy of response. The locus of controversy 
is whether those specific representations are phenomenal. (2007b: 531) 
 
It is very natural to read this passage as saying that Block argues that in the 
Sperling paradigm there is not only informational, but also visible persistence, or 
in his terminology, ‘phenomenal persistence’ (ibid.: 487). That is, he holds the 
VISIBLE thesis. However, above we have just argued that this cannot be the 
case, since if so he has to disagree with the standard conception, but he does 
not. What is going on here? 
 One possible conclusion can be drawn is that Block’s view is a 
nonstarter: given that psychology has strongly established that informational 
and visible persistence are simply different elements of iconic memory and the 
Sperling paradigm is not about visible persistence at all, Block’s view (i.e., the 
VISIBLE thesis) is simply false (Irvine 2013: 126-9). This idea is not responsive 
to the puzzle that Block does not even attempt to refute Coltheart and Di 
Lollo; rather, he cites them rather approvingly. A better interpretation, I 
submit, is that Block’s view is not a challenge to the standard conception, and 
that is why he agrees with the standard conception when discussing them. 
How can this be? The answer is that Block mischaracterises the dialectic, and 
since the characterisation is so natural, many of his opponents follow that as 
well. Block (2007b) talks extensively about phenomenal or visible persistence, 
as if it is his subject matter: as if he is arguing that in the Sperling experiment, 
not only informational but also visible persistence are involved. But this is not 
what he is aiming at. Recall the passage quoted above: ‘[t]here have to be such 
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specific representations given that any location can be cued with high accuracy 
of response. The locus of controversy is whether those specific representations are 
phenomenal.’ The correct reading of this claim should be this: it is right to say 
that the Sperling paradigm concerns informational persistence only, as the 
standard conception has it, but there is a further question, namely: whether the 
persisting information in the visual system is phenomenal. This sounds pretty 
much like the common reading I am resisting, but we need to distinguish them 
carefully. As the standard conception says, and Block should agree, visible 
persistence is something else that should be tested with other paradigms and 
methods. However, based on this shared starting point, one can still ask a 
further question: is the persisting information involved in the Sperling 
paradigm phenomenal? This sounds so similar to the common 
(mis)understanding of the dialectic that even Block himself is sometimes 
confused in characterising the debate, and that is why he mentions visible 
persistence constantly in his argumentation. But if my proposal here is correct, 
the subject matter is informational persistence only. Elizabeth Irvine’s reading 
(2013) is too strong in that it does not take the crucial passage I quoted by 
Block above into account. 
 Since I believe all parties should agree that Sperling’s paradigm is only 
about informational persistence, from now on I will not mention visible 
persistence at all so that we can avoid confusion. Again the question we should 
be asking is that given that in the Sperling paradigm we must postulate 
informational persistence to explain subject’s cognitive achievement, is the 
persisting information phenomenal? What we mean by ‘phenomenal’ is this: 
some information is phenomenal if and only if it shows up in experience. So the 
question is: ‘does the persisting information show up in experience?’ If the 
answer is positive, and Block certainly thinks it is, then the resulting view is the 
EXPERIENTIAL thesis. Now there is a further thesis that Block seems to hold, 
namely that not only that the persisting information shows up in experience, 
but also this experiential information plays a causal role in explaining 
participants’ cognitive achievement. The relevant experience explains the 
success of reports. Call this further claim the ENABLING thesis. Block seems 
to hold this view because he emphasises the fact that many participants say 
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that they read off answers from residual visual phenomenology. That means 
visual phenomenology is casually relevant in achieving the Sperling task. 
 Let me try to present the dialectic in a more structural way. I argue that 
we have three propositions to reconcile: 
 
A. The standard conception has it that Sperling’s case concerns 
informational persistence only; visible persistence is a fundamentally 
different phenomenon. 
 
B. Block (2007b, c) basically agrees with this conception. 
 
C. Block’s OVERFLOW says the Sperling case involves not only 
informational but visible persistence. 
 
They are inconsistent because A and C contradict each other and B says that 
Block agrees with A. The way out I suggested is to recognise that contrary to 
the natural reading, Block’s argument for OVERFLOW is not about visible or 
phenomenal persistent understood in Coltheart’s sense at all, albeit Block 
himself seems to miss this point as well. That is, I propose that we should deny 
C. What he is arguing is in effect that the persisting information in Sperling’s 
paradigm is phenomenal, i.e., shows up in experience. This is different from the 
claim that in Sperling’s paradigm not only informational but also visible 
persistence understood in Coltheart’s sense are involved. Irvine (2013) holds 
onto C and does not discuss B at all, i.e., it is not that she considers this tripod 
and argues that we should give up B; she seems to miss B, and therefore she 
can proceed to hold C. But B is a matter of Block scholarship; it is something 
we can settle by perusing Block (2007b, c). As far as I can tell, Block agrees 
with the standard conception in page 490 and 494. So I suggest we should keep 
B. And we can decide whether A is true by reviewing the relevant 
psychological literature. As far as I can tell A is also true. Whether this 
conception is correct is not relevant to our purposes; the point is that it is 
standard and Block believes it too. And Irvine agrees with this understanding 
of the standard conception (2013: 126). 
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 So where are we now at this point? There are three theses involved in 
the present discussion: 
 
VISIBLE Thesis: In the Sperling paradigm, not only informational 
persistence but also visible persistence in Coltheart’s sense are involved. 
 
EXPERIENTIAL Thesis: In the Sperling paradigm, some pieces of 
persisting information show up in experiences. 
 
ENABLING Thesis: In the Sperling paradigm, the pieces of 
information showing up in experiences play a causal role in explaining 
participants’ success of reports. 
 
In this section I have argued that we should not read Block as holding the 
VISIBLE thesis, even if he himself is not clear about this. I also offered reasons 
why Block does hold both the EXPERIENTIAL thesis and the ENABLING 
thesis. My discussion here is perhaps longer than it needs, but this is because if 
I am right here, virtually every piece in this literature misunderstands this 
crucial dialectic. This does not mean that the extant discussions are all useless, 
to be sure, but to make progress this correction of our take of the dialectic has 
to be solid. 
 
2.2 Block’s Case for OVERFLOW and Its Critics 
In the quotation above (2007c: 531), Block says that to postulate specific 
representations to explain participants’ performances is uncontroversial. This 
refers to the idea that informational persistence is invoked to explain the 
success of report. Block then argues that these specific representations are 
phenomenal. As a result, the notion of ‘specific phenomenology’ becomes 
crucial to him. This section discusses Block’s understanding of the notion and 
his arguments that specific phenomenology is involved before the cue. 
 In the original paper, Block does not have this terminology for the 
notion. There he talks about ‘experience…as of more specific shape’ (2007c: 
489). In the reply, he makes explicit the notion and applies it to the Sperling 
paradigm. He argues that before the cue, participants enjoy: 
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 Generic phenomenology: ‘that there is an array of alphanumeric 
characters.’ 
 Specific phenomenology: ‘of specific shapes of all or most items in the 
array.’ 
 
An initial question is how to make of the nature of this distinction. Block 
seems to think that they are different in kind. For example he writes: 
 
My argument is that before the cue, there is specific phenomenology 
for all or almost all items (and also generic phenomenology, though that 
does not figure in the argument). (2007c: 531; my emphasis) 
 
So for him, generic and specific phenomenologies are two layers; they do not 
constitute a continuous spectrum.9 However, he does not offer arguments for 
this view. For our purposes I bypass this issue. For now I focus on specific 
phenomenology, which is Block’s way to capture phenomenal specificity. 
Unfortunately, Block does not further explicate the notion beyond the 
statement quoted above. In order to make progress, in this section I will work 
with the simple characterisation he gives, and consider his various arguments 
for either the EXPERIENTIAL thesis or ENABLING thesis.10 Later in the 
chapter I will seek to improve our notion of specific phenomenology. With his 
notion of specific phenomenology, we can reformulate the two theses Block 
holds more specifically: 
 
Block’s EXPERIENTIAL Thesis: In the Sperling paradigm, participants 
have specific phenomenology for almost every item. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 M. G. F. Martin points out to me that the layer view and the spectrum view are not as such 
incompatible; for example it is possible that within each layer there is a spectrum along certain 
dimension. Since in what follows I do not pursue this idea, rather I will focus on specific 
phenomenology only, I shall not commit myself to any substantive view concern this matter 
here. 
10 As it stands, Block’s characterisation is either false or circular. An uncharitable reader can 
say that we can have fuzzy or indeterminate phenomenology ‘of specific shapes,’ so the 
characterisation is false. A more charitable reading is that we have specific phenomenology of 
specific shapes, but this renders the characterisation circular, since specific phenomenology is 
what we want to understand here. But in this section I assume for the sake of argument that 
we can make intuitive sense of specific phenomenology, and proceed to examine Block’s 
arguments to see if they are any good. 
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We here use ‘specific phenomenology’ to replace ‘persisting information in 
experiences.’ Also we use ‘almost every’ to replace ‘some’ because Block insists 
on this stronger view (2007b, c, passim). In addition to this, we have 
 
Block’s ENABLING Thesis: In the Sperling paradigm, specific 
phenomenology is causally responsible for the success of reports. 
 
The latter thesis entails the former one, so if Block has a good case for the 
latter, it is sufficient to make his case. Now to the arguments and replies. 
 
Argument 1: ‘As Burge notices, subjects (including myself [i.e., Block]) in 
overflow experiments often testify that their responses are based on specific 
phenomenology that was there all along.’ (Block 2007c, 531) 
Reply: This claim about ‘based on’ reinforces the interpretation that 
Block also holds the stronger ENABLING thesis. It is true that we should take 
seriously participants’ reports at least as the starting point, but given the 
transient nature of the stimuli in the Sperling case, one can reasonably suspect 
that subjects are not in a good position to have a true description of their 
experiences. It may be true that they read off answers from specific 
phenomenologies, but it does not mean that those phenomenologies are there 
all along. It is possible that those specific pieces of information are there all along, 
but they become conscious only after the cue tone. Also, there is a distinction 
between participants actually read off answers from visual phenomenology and 
participants feel that they read off answers like that. Only the former supports 
the ENABLING thesis, but from their reports there is no way to tease these 
two hypotheses apart. 
 
Argument 2: ‘Subjects are attending to arrays in full view, in good viewing 
conditions, for half a second in…some versions of the Sperling 
experiments…more than enough time for specific phenomenology (Burge also 
makes this point).’ (ibid., 532) 
Reply: This argument is supposed to support the weaker 
EXPERIENTIAL thesis. This is a point about timing. Suppose, contrary to any 
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Sperling experiment, we show the array of letters for a really long time, say ten 
seconds. But we ask subjects to fixate at a given point, and try to report all 
letters by switching their attention. This should be an easy task, since in this 
setting they have plenty of time (if ten seconds are not enough, we can further 
prolong it). Now I predict that if participants fixate at the middle of the screen, 
and turn their attention to the upper row in order to report letters there, they 
will not have specific phenomenologies of the lower row at that moment, no 
matter how long the stimuli persist. If so, then it is not true that participants 
have specific phenomenologies of almost all items all along in the standard 
Sperling experiments, since they cannot have that even in the version I am 
envisaging, i.e., the stimuli persist for a really long time. It is the spatial 
arrangement of the stimuli that prevents us from having specific 
phenomenologies of most items, given the limits of fovea vision and attention. 
This is not just a speculation; we can actually do it with any demo for iconic 
memory test or with the stimuli on a piece of paper. 
 
Argument 3: ‘If there is only generic phenomenology before the cue, and if the 
cue causes the generic phenomenology to be replaced by specific 
phenomenology, then there is a shift from generic to specific phenomenology. 
The fact that subjects report no such phenomenological shift might not be 
strong evidence against this view, but it is some evidence.’ (ibid.) 
Reply: This is again about the EXPERIENTIAL thesis, and more 
specifically about the kind(s) of phenomenology involved. Here I agree with 
Block that it is probably some evidence, but it is indeed not a very strong one. 
Consider the famous Carrasco ‘attention alters appearance’ experiments: 
 
 
Figure 1, from Carrasco et. al. (2004) 
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The four dots in the figure are fixation points. Let’s try the one between the 
22% patch and the 28% one. If you fixate at that dot and covertly switch your 
attention to the 22% patch, the attention will boost the contrast of that patch 
so that it looks just like the 28% one (contrasts are defined objectively via 
mathematics). Now, do participants feel the transition before and after they 
shift attention? Arguably not. The reason for this, I submit, is that the effect 
attention can give us is not very drastic. Comparing the case of eyeglasses. If 
one has myopic and he uses a pair of glasses for better sight, his visual 
phenomenologies before and after he puts on the glasses will be extremely 
different. After all, that is the whole point of having glasses. Therefore, 
whenever he puts on or takes off glasses, he will feel a shift/transition of 
phenomenology. However, attention does not work like this. Although it will 
alter appearances, as Carrasco and her colleagues have shown, the effect is 
incomparable with glasses. This explains why subjects do not feel the shift of 
phenomenology, and thereby saves Block’s opponent at least in this respect. 
Moreover, Block’s opponents do not have to hold that before the cue there is 
only generic phenomenology. For example, his opponents can hold that before 
the cue, there are some specific phenomenologies due to attentional effects: 
before the cue, participants’ attention will flow randomly so that they will enjoy 
certain specific phenomenologies. There will be more on this view in my reply 
to argument 6. 
 
Argument 4: ‘There is evidence mentioned in the target article that cortical 
persistence obtains at all levels of the visual system and therefore at the 
phenomenal level as well…Hence, there is a neural case for phenomenal 
persistence.’ (ibid.) 
Reply: There is indeed a case to be made here for the EXPERIENTIAL 
thesis. However, as Coltheart stresses, neural persistence should also be 
separated from phenomenal persistence (1980, 184). Block is right in pointing 
out that neural persistence might favour his view to some extent, but more 
need to be said at this point if one wants to bridge neural and phenomenal 
persistence. Simply pointing out there is neural persistence does not itself 
constitute any support for phenomenal persistence, since whether that 
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particular neural persistence is the neural substrate of phenomenology is to be 
determined. 
 
Argument 5: This one is about ‘Di Lollo’s paradigm using a 5 by 5 grid in 
which all but one of the squares is filled with a dot. Subjects see a partial grid 
with 12 of the dots filled in, then, after a delay, another partial grid with a 
different 12 dots filled in. The subjects’ task is to report which square has a 
missing dot… [In] the variant by Brockmole et al. (2002)…the appearance of 
the second partial grid was delayed by as long as 5 seconds and in which 
subjects were told that a good strategy was to “imagine the dots still being 
present after they disappear” (317).’ (ibid.) 
Reply: Block’s main point here is that the delay of 5 seconds is so long 
that we need phenomenal persistence to explain the situation. This might be 
about the ENABLING thesis since perhaps participants are answering based on 
their imaginations. However, I believe the fact that it is so long should be 
interpreted as a ground to cast doubt on phenomenal persistence, contra Block. 
As he notices, participants are instructed to ‘imagine’ the persistence, and this 
opens the possibility that they are using their conceptual, cognitive capacities to 
do so, as opposed to phenomenal capacities. Again, more needs to be said for 
Block to make this argument work. 
 
Argument 6: ‘Kouider et al….hypothesize that Sperling-like paradigms result 
from “partial awareness: subjects have a transient and degraded access to 
fragments of all the letters in the grid.”…What are Kouider et al. saying about 
specific phenomenology? No specific phenomenology at all is not compatible 
with their view, since they say subjects are to some degree conscious of and 
have access to “fragments of all the letters in the grid”.’ (ibid.) 
Reply: Block is right in pointing out that Kouider et al. (2007) cannot 
maintain that no specific phenomenology before the cue. But they need not, as 
I mentioned in my reply to argument 3. Block’s opponents can hold that 
attention gives rise to some specific phenomenologies. Since before the cue, 
participants’ attention will flow randomly, they will enjoy some specific 
phenomenologies. This explains why in the trials without any cue, subjects can 
still report correctly around four (random) letters. So Block’s opponents 
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should not hold that there is absolutely no specific phenomenology before the 
cue. What they should insist is that those specific phenomenologies are not as 
rich as Block describes. Consider a similar distinction of gist and object 
perception in psychology. In relevant experiments, the stimuli persist so short 
that participants can only report accurately about the gist. This does not imply 
that subjects see absolutely no detail. They do see some, but not as much as 
Block’s view predicts. 
 
What does all this leave to us? I am certainly not asserting that Block’s 
six arguments are all defeated. What I have attempted to show is that all of 
them raise substantive issues that need to be considered further, but none of 
them is unanswerable by his opponents. So here I conclude that Block has not 
established that before the cue in the Sperling paradigm, participants have 
specific phenomenology for almost every item. 
 To summarise, in this section I argue that Block has not provided a 
satisfactory understanding of what specific phenomenology is, and even if we 
proceed with his simple characterisation and evaluate his arguments, none of 
them really establishes his version of the EXPERIENTIAL and ENABLING 
theses. In the next section I will connect the present discussion to the subject 
matter of a previous chapter, the analogue character of vision. 
 
2.3 Specific Phenomenology and the Analogue 
One entry point to think about specific phenomenology is this. Block’s 
opponents can raise this reasonable challenge: if pieces of phenomenology 
before the cue are indeed specific, how is it that we still miss the identity of 
many letters? That is, how is it possible that a piece of phenomenology is 
specific but neutral between ‘E’ and ‘F’? This query can be stated in terms of 
spatial, textual, and other visual features as well. It is this query that leads many 
to the fragmentary view (e.g., Kouider et al. 2010) and the generic view (e.g., 
Stazicker 2011). They believe that phenomenology is non-specific because, say, 
it can be neutral between ‘E,’ ‘F,’ and maybe some pseudo letters. They then 
come up with positive proposals of ways of being non-specific, for example 
indeterminate or vague (Stazicker 2011), inexact or shifty (Hellie 2005), and so 
on. Many of those proposals are worthy of exploring. But here I will argue that 
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even if under certain circumstances vision is indeterminate or inexact (e.g., 
peripheral vision), there is still a case to be made for specific phenomenology. 
Or at least, we need to explain why some visual experiences purport to be 
specific, even if they are not as specific as Block proposes.11 
 Recall what Peacocke means by ‘matching profile’: for direction, the 
‘matching profile is a set of directions: a given direction is in the set if and only 
if it is not discriminably outside the apparent direction of the end of the 
perceived arm’ (1986: 4). The bigger a matching profile’s range is, the lower a 
subject’s visual acuity is. Also recall that Peacocke points out that ‘precise 
direction experienced’ is incoherent: given that human discriminatory 
capacities are limited, there has to be a set of direction that is compatible with 
an experience and still makes the experience veridical. Now consider our case 
of ‘E’ and ‘F.’ An experience can purport to be specific even if it is neutral 
between ‘E’ and ‘F.’ In daily life, if one’s experience is neutral between ‘E’ and 
‘F,’ this person’s visual acuity will be judged as quite low. However, if it is in 
certain experimental settings such as the Sperling paradigm, it is more 
reasonable to have this kind of acuity because the duration of the stimuli is 
down to millisecond’s scale. 
 Now, does this conception of specific phenomenology serve Block’s 
purpose? I believe the answer is negative. For Block, he needs phenomenology 
that is specific enough for report accurately. The analogue conception allows an 
experience be specific to some extent but still undecided between, say, ‘E’ and 
‘F.’ In that case, the reports will be inaccurate. We have independent reasons to 
hold this analogue conception of vision, as the previous chapter has argued, 
but it does not serve Block’s purpose. A deeper response is that this analogue 
conception does not commit any version of the ENABLING thesis: it is about 
vision’s character and is neutral about its causal power. If this is so, there is no 
prospect that this conception of specific phenomenology can help with Block’s 
agenda. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Presumably, Block would answer to this challenge by saying that given his distinction 
between P-consciousness and A-consciousness, this challenge is not a serious one, since he can 
say that participants’ phenomenology is actually specific, and the neutrality comes from access. 
Given that they are separate in Block’s picture, it is plausible for him to say that the point is no 
challenge for him. However, this begs the question against the current point. Whether we can 
sensibly draw the distinction between phenomenology and access is exactly at issue. To assume 
it and say that there is no challenge here is not very effective. 
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 There are two things we want to explain in the Sperling-style cases: the 
success and the failure of reports. The analogue conception might not be able 
to do so, since as I just argued it is silent about the causal power of visual 
experience. The success and the failure can all be explained in informational 
terms. However, the analogue conception can explain the nature of specific 
phenomenology involved in Sperling’s paradigm. Suppose there is an ‘E’ in the 
cued row. Since it is cued, if the participant has followed the instruction, she 
should shift her attention to the given row. This improves her visual acuity of 
that row, i.e., the relevant matching profile shrinks so that ‘F’ can be ruled out. 
By contrast, if ‘E’ is in an un-cued row, the subject’s matching profile there will 
be bigger, so perhaps ‘F’ will fall within the range, and she might fail to 
differentiate ‘E’ and ‘F’ in her experiences in that case. Block’s picture is 
different from this since in his picture, in the un-cued rows the range of 
specific phenomenology will only cover one letter, say different shapes or fonts 
of ‘E,’ but not other similar letters such as ‘F.’ His claim here crucially relies on 
an independence assumption, which will be discussed and rejected in Chapter 3. 
 As briefly mentioned at the beginning, Block takes Landman et al. 
(2003) as a further evidence for his view. Here is the illustration: 
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Figure 4. From Landman 2003 
 
In the crucial trial (condition C), the participants need to indicate whether the 
pointed item has changed its orientation after the delay. Like the Sperling 
original experiment, what is surprising is that if the cue appears after the first 
set of stimuli, and the gap between is quite large (hundreds of milliseconds), 
participants can still perform the tasks quite well. In this series of experiment, 
the delay is much longer than many other paradigms (i.e., can be up to 1500 
milliseconds). Block takes it that the longer delay further supports his view. 
However, it has been pointed out (Phillips 2011) that here the measurement is 
forced choice, which is much less demanding than the original Sperling case, in 
which participants need to come up with the identities of letters. The forced 
choice method, though useful for many purposes, is crucially different from 
our original case. In terms of the analogue account, we should say that the cue 
directs our attention to the target so that the relevant matching profile 
becomes more sensitive, i.e., narrower. By the same token, if the cue does not 
appear at the right timing or at all, the matching profile will be much larger in 
range so that it might not even be able to differentiate horizontal and vertical 
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targets. Again, this might sound unlikely in normal cases, but given that in 
experiments the duration of the stimuli is several hundreds milliseconds, it is 
understandable that without the cuing effect the matching profile will be pretty 
huge, i.e., the visual acuity will be pretty low. This explains the specific 
phenomenology in the Landman 2003 experiment, but remain silent about 
whether these pieces of specific phenomenology play a causal role. 
 To conclude this chapter, both Block’s understanding of specific 
phenomenology and his arguments for his version of the EXPERIENTIAL and 
ENABLING theses are unsatisfactory. His arguments do not work for different 
reasons I explained under individual arguments. And his notion of specific 
phenomenology is unsatisfactory since his characterisation of it is not 
substantive enough, and probably false. As an alternative I offer an analogue 
understanding for this notion, which heavily draws conceptual resources from 
Peacocke’s early works on visual characters. Finally, although I have argued 
against Block’s case, I argue that it is unsuccessful for subtler reasons, contra 
Irvine’s idea that Block’s case fails simply because it flies in the face of the fact 
that from the 80s psychologists has recognised the difference between visible 
and informational persistence. 
 What is my own take of the matter? I hold a version of the 
EXPERIENTIAL thesis, which is as follows: 
 
Weak EXPERIENTIAL Thesis: In the Sperling paradigm, participants 
have phenomenology that purports to be specific in an analogue 
fashion.12 
 
As for the ENABLING thesis, the situation is more complicated. On the one 
hand, the denial of it might lead us to unwanted epiphenomenalism. This view 
might be true but certainly requires more defence. On the other hand, if one 
affirms the thesis one might need to face the over-determination problem: if 
information persistence is postulated to explain subjects’ cognitive 
achievement, it is supposed to be sufficient. But if so, why do we need specific 
phenomenology in the causal explanation at all? Here I make no commitment 
to the ENABLING thesis. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 More on this in Chapter 3. 
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 Let’s remind ourselves why the analogue account about discrimination 
can help us understand the Sperling case. Sperling’s task is not itself a 
discrimination task. It is about categorisation and memory, so it is not simply a 
perception task. Talking about discrimination is relevant not because Sperling 
is a discrimination task (it isn’t), but because discrimination is relevant to 
specific phenomenology which is crucial in understanding the paradigm.13 
Next chapter we move to issues concerning attention. In the Sperling 
paradigm, the cue is effective because it directs participants’ attention. This is 
plainly true, but at the same time quite vacuous. ‘Attention’ can mean many 
different things in daily language, and also in psychology. This semantic 
problem is a difficult one. What’s more, even after roughly fixing the meaning, 
the nature of a given kind of attention is difficult to be determined. This will be 
the main topic of Chapter 3, but the major concern of the essay – 
understanding phenomenal specificity as an element of visual knowledge – 
should be always in the background. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 In discussing Block, I use his term ‘specific phenomenology’ throughout, since after his 
2007 reply to the critics it has become the standard phenomenology. We can say that Block 
uses that notion to understand what phenomenal specificity – our main topic – consists in. As 
discussed above, the notion he provides is unsatisfying, so the main aim of this essay is to 
provide a more substantive and plausible notion for understanding phenomenal specificity. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
 
Attention: Selection, Access and Modulation 
 
3.1 Attention as Selection: Psychology 
 
In this chapter, I explore the role attention plays in the Sperling paradigm and 
other cases. The reason for this is that attention is crucial in vision, visual 
experience, and the formation of visual beliefs. There are at least two questions 
we can ask about attention; the first is the metaphysical nature of it (what 
attention is), and secondly the functions of it (what attention does). Answers to 
these questions would perhaps inform each other, but still, there is a matter of 
emphasis. For example, Christopher Mole’s theory that attention is cognitive 
unison (2011) places more emphasis on the metaphysical question (e.g., 
multiple realisability, levels of explanation, and supervenience in 30-4), while 
Sebastian Watzl places more emphasis on what attention does when putting 
forward the thesis that ‘consciously attending to something consists of the 
conscious mental process of structuring one stream of consciousness so that 
some parts of it are more central than others’ (2011: 145; my emphasis). In 
what follows I too will focus more on the functions of attention, as it is more 
relevant to my purposes here. 
 It is notoriously difficult to pin down what we mean by ‘attention.’ 
Here are some examples: pop-out, searching, monitoring, tracking, vigilance, 
selecting (Prinz 2010). In addition to these, psychologists draw two useful 
distinctions. The first is between overt and covert attention. When one shifts 
	   51 
one’s attention by moving one’s eyes or heads, it is a case of overt attention. By 
contrast, when one shifts attention without any observable behaviours, then we 
have a case of covert attention. Since overt attention involves certain bodily 
movements, it trivially involves a different set of neural substrates from covert 
attention. This point is sometimes worth making because some people might 
think that neural substrates are crucial in individuating kinds of attention. The 
second distinction – endogenous and exogenous attention – is more 
complicated. Endogenous attention is also known as top-down attention; it 
involves a subject’s intention to direct her or his attention, while exogenous, 
bottom-up attention does not. So for example, if you are attending to the 
lecture and suddenly distracted by the siren outside the building, your 
endogenous attention to the speech is interrupted by exogenous attention that 
is drawn by the siren. Of course in real case the distinction is fuzzier, but the 
idea should be clear. This second distinction involves more controversies, since 
it is not clear whether endogenous and exogenous attention actually form a 
natural kind (i.e., whether they are the same or different in kind). But again 
metaphysical questions are not to the point in this project, so I shall set the 
worry aside for the moment. 
 What are the connections between these distinctions and the Sperling 
case? Recall that after the stimuli go off and a temporal gap, the cue comes in 
signifying which row should be reported. Assuming that participants are 
following the instruction of fixation, what they are using is covert attention 
when they need to report letters that are outside of the fovea. Also, since they 
are instructed to follow the cue, endogenous attention is thereby involved. How 
about the various tasks suggested by Prinz? Assuming participants are 
cooperating well, they should be vigilant in general during the trial, but in 
addition to that, what attention does for generating the reports is first and 
foremost selection, since the cue directs participants to select relevant letters. 
After that, participants need to access those letters so that they can report. How 
to understand the relevant notion of selection and access in this context is 
crucial for making progress. 
 Selection has always been a central theme in understanding attention. 
The debate between early and late selection is a classic example (Deutsch and 
Deutsch 1963). Against this background, Sperling’s paradigm was designed to 
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test this function of attention, amongst other things. The notion of selection 
here seems to be intuitive enough – there is more information than we can 
handle at a given time, so we need to select parts of them for further 
processing. However, psychologists do not always mean the same thing when 
they use the term, and this will prove important when we assess the status of 
the rich view. 
 Contemporary research of selective attention began from Donald 
Broadbent’s experiment on dichotic listening (1952). Typically, participants are 
presented with two simultaneous but different stimuli to the two ears. And the 
instruction is to pay attention to the message presented only to a certain ear. 
There have been many variations of this paradigm. Broadbent himself (1958) 
interprets the data as showing that stimuli that do not need response are 
discarded before being fully processed. A ‘selective filter’ is then postulated to 
explain the phenomenon. In this way, psychologists operationalise selection in 
informational terms (see also chapter 1). If relevant information is processed 
(to the extent that needs to be specified for specific purpose), then it is selected. 
 However, in certain contexts psychologists sometimes seem to have a 
more demanding idea of selection. For example, in our key Sperling case, one 
wants to know that whether participants can ‘selectively report items from very 
brief visual displays’ (Styles 2006: 27-8). In this case, selection means not only 
information processing but also reportability, which is a much more 
demanding notion. It is closer to what philosophers mean by ‘access’ (see next 
section). In order to make the contrast clear, I reserve the term ‘selection’ for 
information processing and use the term ‘access’ to maintain the link to 
reportability and rationality.14 
 
3.2 Attention as Access: Philosophy 
 
To develop the line of thought from last section, one can define access in 
purely information processing terms if one wishes, as in the case of selection, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Attention as selection is perhaps the key of cognitive psychology. Many later works seek to 
refine our understanding of it. For example Pashler (1997) further explores the question 
whether there is a bottleneck of attention, and Lavie (1995) proposes the notion of load to 
resolve the early-late selection debate. It is not sensible to try in summarising the relevant 
history in this context. All we need is to be clear that selection and access should mean 
different things in the study of attention. 
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but this might render it too weak. For example, if what we mean by ‘access’ 
here is simply ‘receiving information,’ then selection entails access, in which 
case we do not need that additional notion. Also, that weak notion of access is 
more useful when we talk about systems such as computers, in which a unit 
accesses information in another unit for further processing, but if our subject 
matter is human subjects, and more importantly, we want our notion of access 
to do some epistemological work in relation to knowledge, we had better 
defining a more substantive notion of access in order to fit our purposes. At 
this point, Block’s definition of what he calls ‘access consciousness’ is helpful: 
 
[A state is] A-conscious if it is poised for direct control of thought and 
action… [A] representation is A-conscious if it is poised for free use in 
reasoning and for direct ‘rational’ control of action and speech 
(1995a/2007a: 168; my emphasis) 
 
By ‘A-consciousness’ Block means ‘access consciousness.’ In what follows, 
however, when I use this and other similar notions I will use the term 
‘accessibility.’ One reason is that in the definition Block makes it clear that it is 
a dispositional notion (‘poised’), so it is actually accessibility, rather than access. Also, 
some have argued that A-consciousness is not a kind of consciousness at all 
(Block 1995b/2007a: 219), and for my purposes I do not need to insist on this 
anyway. Now with this definition in place, we can define ‘access’ by taking out 
the dispositional qualification (poised for…), since the only relevant difference 
between access and accessibility here is whether it is dispositional or not. Now, 
the key virtue of this definition for us is that it links access to rationality, which 
is what we need in order to make the transition to knowledge. To be sure, 
‘rationality’ is itself a term of art that needs further elucidation, but at least we 
need the term in place first as a starting point. 
 The discussion of selection and access brings us back to Campbell’s 
framework. In his recent work (e.g., 2011), he explicitly invokes the distinction 
between selection and access. Campbell says that selection and access are ‘two 
different aspects of attention’ (2011: 324), and this fits well with what we said 
above: there is no need to have a single notion of attention, at least for our 
purposes. Attention selects relevant information for further processing, and it 
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helps us access relevant information so that we can use them to make 
inferences and guide actions. There might be a question about individuating 
kinds of attention (e.g., what do we mean by ‘aspect’ here?), but this 
metaphysical query can be bracketed when it comes to understanding the 
Sperling case and the nature of visual knowledge. Campbell says that people 
very often mean ‘access’ when they talk about attention (ibid.: 323-4). By that I 
take it that he is referring to philosophers (e.g., Block 2007b, Burge 2007, 
Smithies 2011), since as we have seen above in psychology what has been 
dominant is ‘selection.’ But in the present context there is no need to choose 
one and abandon the other; we can invoke both as long as we are clear on 
what the differences are and what theoretical works we want them to do 
respectively. 
 Campbell first introduced this distinction in Reference and Consciousness 
with Treisman’s feature map theory, but in recent works he elucidates the 
distinction by referring to the Boolean map theory by Huang and Pashler 
(2007). In what follows I will not dwell on explicating that specific theory, 
since what Campbell says about selection and access and what I have to say 
about them do not hinge on that theory, and as it happens Campbell holds a 
different view from the one proposed by Huang and Pashler, so in order to 
avoid confusion in our discussion it is better not to mention the theory by 
Huang and Pashler. So much for disclaimers. Campbell’s position here is this: 
 
[W]e should regard experience of a property as a matter of being in a 
position to use the property as the basis on which an object or region is 
selected, rather than as a matter of accessing the property. (2011: 324) 
 
Campbell acknowledges that both selection and access are aspects of attention, 
but he attempts to tie experience to selection. With Campbell’s own usage, 
‘selection’ means ‘using a property to select a region or object,’ and ‘access’ 
means ‘accessing a property of a region or object’ (ibid.: 325). This is where we 
can make a connection between the current discussion to the one concerning 
Block in the previous chapter. Recall that Block holds what he calls 
‘OVERFLOW’ or ‘rich view,’ and in evaluating his arguments I made a 
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distinction between the experiential thesis and the enabling thesis. I hold a 
version of the former, which says: 
 
Weak EXPERIENTIAL Thesis: In the Sperling paradigm, participants 
have phenomenology (or conscious experience) that purports to be 
specific in an analogue fashion. 
 
This is not an enabling thesis because it is silent about whether consciousness 
has causal powers in relevant regards. This is a weak version of the thesis 
because it is weaker than Block’s standard version, which says that by ‘specific’ 
we ought to mean ‘specific enough for reporting accurately.’ However, the 
analogue account adopted here (from Peacocke) says that many pieces of 
phenomenology can purport to be specific in Block’s sense, i.e., they inform 
subjects that they are that specific; however, they can be neutral between, say, 
‘E’ and ‘F,’ so that it can sustain reports’ accuracy to some extent, but not as 
good as Block supposes. In the view I am proposing those pieces of 
phenomenology are still specific because, say, they definitely rule out ‘L’, ‘K,’ 
and many other letters, though not decisive when it comes to ‘E’ and F.’ This 
is the major dialectic throughout this essay. In Chapter 1 we discussed notions 
of analogue because it is helpful for us to understand ‘specific phenomenology.’ 
In the current chapter we are discussing Campbell’s distinction between 
selection and access because it helps us understand how attention is involved 
in this picture. It might be hard to keep track of the general dialectic at this 
stage, but I will try to connect the present discussion back to the main thread 
when appropriate.15 Now here is Campbell’s formulation of the rich view: 
 
On this analysis, the connection of experience of a property to the 
visual information-processing machinery we have been describing is 
this: Experience of the property is what makes it possible for that 
property to be used as the basis for selection of a region or object. Access 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 In page 328-9 of the 2011 paper, Campbell describes the debate between the rich and sparse 
views concerning consciousness, and proceeds to offer his own view on it. This is blatantly the 
Block dialectic (2007a). However, Campbell does not mention any discussion from Block as 
well as other relevant thinkers, maybe for the ease of argumentation. I do not wish to 
investigate the author’s psychology here. What I want to stress is that to see Campbell’s effort 
in the 2011 paper this way is not a stretch at all – what he is engaging here is exactly the main 
concern of this essay, albeit he prefers conducting the discussion from different angles. 
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to the property is a distinct phenomenon, subsequent to the 
involvement of consciousness. This analysis lends itself to a rich view 
of conscious experience. (2011: 330; my emphasis) 
 
And he uses an example of colour vision to argue for this point: 
 
Consider a child, at this stage of development [2-year-old], looking at 
the kind of display often used to test for color-blindness – a green 5, 
say, showing against a background of red blobs, with the blobs 
constituting the 5 differing randomly from each other and from the 
blobs constituting the background in luminance, in shape, and in every 
other characteristic except hue…Whether the child can see the 5 is one 
thing. Whether the child is able to access the color of the object is 
another…[T]he child may be able to see the 5 without having anything 
in the way of color vocabulary, without being able to give any report of 
the color of the 5. Moreover, being able to see the 5 is consistent with 
not being able to put information about color to any further use [e.g., 
color induction]. (ibid.: 331; my emphasis) 
 
Here we can see that Campbell’s usage of ‘access’ fits the definition adopted 
here, i.e., the one from Block (1995a, 2007b) that emphasises the connection 
to rational and inferential capacities. For those who use a more deflationary 
definition of access (e.g., receiving information), it might be arguable that the 
example above still involves access, but this is compatible with the present 
claim, namely that given a thicker notion of access being adopted here, it is 
both conceptually and temporally separated from selection and experience. 
The justification of putting this notion of access in a central place here, again, 
is that it makes a connection to knowledge. Now what is crucial is to make the 
rich view based on the distinction between selection and access plausible. The 
case from other animals would be more vivid. Many animals have colour vision, 
but they cannot access the information in the relevant sense. I believe this is 
the correct way of thinking about the relation between attention and visual 
experience, i.e., one aspect of attention, namely selection, goes with experience, 
but the other aspect, namely access defined above, goes beyond experience.  
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 How does this lend support to the interpretation of the Sperling 
experiment defended above? The view here says that the things which are 
selected are richer than those being accessed. In the Sperling case, we should 
say that participants select most items on the screen: it is not as if the un-cued 
rows do not enter into their visual consciousness. But although items in the 
un-cued rows are selected, they are not accessed in the sense that participants 
cannot use them to guide reports accurately. The experiential part of this story 
is accounted by the analogue, as explained in Chapter 2. Now the access part 
of it is accounted by access as one aspect of attention. The cue in the 
experiment directs one’s attention to the target row so that participants access 
the relevant information and report accurately, and this attentional shift 
explains why the items selected but not accessed do not sustain accurate 
reports. 
 Campbell’s ‘selection and access’ framework tells us two functions of 
attention. But I believe there is a third function that is missing in this 
framework. It is what I call ‘modulation’: in selecting and accessing targets, 
attention also modulates our percepts. There are more than one way that 
attention can do this; the Carrasco et al. 2004 finding discussed in Chapter 2 is 
one of them. In understanding the Sperling case, what we need is postdiction, 
since attention is cued after the stimuli offset. The next section evaluates a 
recent attempt of understanding Sperling with postdiction. 
 
3.3 Postdiction as Modulation 
 
The postdiction interpretation of the Sperling case has recently been 
introduced by Ian Phillips (2011). In a sentence, the hypothesis is that in the 
Sperling case what happens is cross-modal postdiction. It is postdiction, because 
according to the view the cue in effect retrospectively modifies what the 
participants consciously see. It is cross-modal because the cue tone is auditory, 
while the original array of stimuli are visual. This second part might not be 
essential to the discussion, since if in the trials we instead use visual cues such 
as arrows, we can still get the same effect and the debate raised by Block would 
still be valid. However, since normally the cue is auditory, it will be important 
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for the proponents of the postdiction interpretation to also argue that cross-
modal postdiction actually happens in standard Sperling cases. 
 Before proceeding, here are three reasons why I need to discuss this 
view at this stage. First of all, I do not agree with certain details of Phillip’s 
version, in particular I believe it is compatible with the weaker version of the 
rich view I hold. Secondly, I will strengthen the view by considering different 
measurements for consciousness and cognitive access. Thirdly, my version of 
the rich view seems to commit myself a certain version of postdiction, and if 
so it is mandatory for me to defend it at least to some extent. 
 I follow Phillips’s steps here in explaining this phenomenon. A 
relatively uncontroversial case is ‘backward visual masking.’ Consider this 
often-cited figure below: 
 
 
 
Figure 2.                    Target Stimulus            Masking Stimulus 
 
If the timing and the shapes of the stimuli are suitably designed, the 
participants will not be aware of the first stimulus. If the second target comes in 
between 50 to 100 ms, the effect will be the strongest (Alpern 1953; see 
Bachmann 1994 for a review). One thing we need to acknowledge immediately 
is that in the Sperling case, the delay can be much longer than 100 ms, so what 
we observe in this simple case cannot be applied directly to the Sperling case. 
Phillips then cites a study by Weisstein and Wong (1986) for the possibility of 
longer delays (Phillips 2011: 387-8). The second important thing to be 
recognised is that we need cross-modal postdiction, as mentioned above. For this, 
consider ‘sound-induced visual bounce.’ A and B move towards each other, 
briefly coincide, and finally move away from each other. Participants either see 
them as bouncing and reversing directions, or see them as pass through each 
other without changing the original directions. If a sound is played at the point 
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of coincidence, or close enough, participants more often see them as bouncing. 
Even when the sound is played with a 150 ms delay, the effect is still there 
(Sekuler, Sekuler, and Lau: 1997: 308). Again, the temporal window here is not 
big enough to apply to the Sperling case. However, in a later study Watanabe 
and Shimojo (2001) shows that ‘though a sound presented 300 ms after visual 
coincidence does not induce bounce, the “bounce-inducing effect was 
attenuated when other identical sounds (auditory flankers) were presented 300 
ms before and after the simultaneous sound” (109)’ (Phillips 2011: 390).16 
 After having a grip of what postdiction perception is, we need to see 
exactly why it is in opposition with Block’s interpretation. The crucial 
assumption denied by this new interpretation is this: 
 
[I]t is legitimate to sum partial reports to establish awareness in relevant 
similar cases…[This is] an independence assumption, viz. that a subject’s 
experience of the stimulus in a PR [i.e., partial report] condition is 
independent of which report is cued because the cue comes only after 
display offset. (ibid.: 385-6) 
 
Postdiction, at least on the face of it, contradicts this independence assumption 
because it says that attention modulates the phenomenology of the cued row so 
that it becomes specific enough for report. On this picture, phenomenology for 
un-cued rows is not as specific as Block has it; it only becomes specific enough 
for accurate report after being cued. This is the core of Phillips’s objection. Now I 
shall move to what I have to say on these matters. 
 First, I believe under suitable interpretation, the cross-modal 
postdiction view is compatible with a weak version of the rich view, or 
OVERFLOW. Recall Block’s strong version of the view: before the cue, we 
have specific phenomenology (in his sense) for all or almost all letters. As we 
have seen, this view is not well supported by his arguments. Some of Block’s 
opponents go for the other extreme and argue that there is only generic 
phenomenology before the cue, for example Kouider et al. 2010. However, 
this view does not seem to do justice to the fact that in the trials in which there 
is no cue at all, the participants can still report about 4 letters accurately. If 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 See this page for demo: http://michaelbach.de/ot/mot_bounce/index.html 
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without the cue we enjoy only generic phenomenology, it is not clear how we 
can accommodate the full report condition. Now, even if the cross-modal 
postdiction interpretation is correct, we can and should still hold that before 
the cue, the participants will have specific phenomenology, though not for 
almost all letters, but for perhaps 4 letters or so. The reason is that before the 
cue, given the fixation point and the pre-cue attention, some parts of the visual 
field will still be more salient than other parts. But overall, the pre-cue 
phenomenology still overflows (i.e., is richer than) what attention can later 
capture, since before the cue there is also generic phenomenology. In a 
sentence, something between Kouider and Block is right (i.e., there are specific 
phenomenologies before the cue, but not as much as Block supposes), and this 
in-between view is compatible with the cross-modal postdiction 
interpretation.17 
 Secondly, the cross-modal postdiction view sits well with some 
findings by Morten Overgaard and his colleagues, which I also endorse. In 
what follows I first introduce the view, then explain its plausibility, and finally 
connect it to the current debate. 
 The leading question for Overgaard et al. is this: ‘Is conscious 
perception gradual or dichotomous’ (Overgaard 2006, 700)? According to 
Sergent and Dehaene (2004), it is dichotomous. The idea is that there is a clear 
threshold for being conscious, and after reaching that threshold consciousness 
is more or less stable. In showing this, Sergent and Dehaene design a scale 
consisting of 21 nodes, with the two extremes defined as seen or unseen. They 
then use this scale in experiments of attentional blink, ‘the phenomenon that 
the identification of a stimulus hinders an explicit report of a second stimulus 
if the two are temporally separated by between 200 and 500 ms’ (Overgaard et 
al. 2006, 701). What Sergent and Dehaene found is that subjects report in an 
all-or-none fashion: they are either conscious of the second stimulus, or not 
conscious of it at all. 
 As Overgaard et al. point out, however, this result from Sergent and 
Dehaene is flawed. For one thing, as Sergent and Dehaene themselves notice, 
subjects’ reports show a more continuous pattern when the experiments are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Perhaps Kouider would reply that he does not think that before the cue subjects have only 
generic phenomenology. Perhaps the view is that for entirely unattended stimuli phenomenology 
is purely generic. In that case I would have no objection here. 
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purely about masking, i.e., are not combined with attention blink. For another, 
and more importantly, the Sergent-Dehaene scale is biased: only two extremes 
are explicitly defined, and there are too many nodes (i.e., 19) in between 
(Overgaard et al. 2006, 702). To see the problem, recall whatever demos with 
short stimuli you have seen before, and ask yourself: is it possible to decide in a 
given case, the degree of conscious awareness is, say 6, as opposed to 8? If 
subjects have a feeling that they clearly see the stimuli, does it make sense to 
choose, say 18, as opposed to 20? It is predictable that given the design of the 
scale, subjects will tend to give all-or-none verdicts. 
 In order to make plausible the view that consciousness is a gradual 
phenomenon, Overgaard et al. propose another scale of measurement, 
Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS). It is ‘a four-point scale categorized as “not 
seen,” “weak glimpse” (meaning “something was there but I had no idea what 
it was”), “almost clear image” (meaning “I think I know what was shown”) and 
“clear image”’ (Overgaard et al. 2006, 702). The improvements are, first, all 
nodes are clearly defined, and secondly, there are only two options between the 
two extremes. With this scale, subjects report in a ‘continuous manner’ (ibid.). 
With these two improvements, PAS is better than the Sergent-Dehaene scale, 
and PAS supports, though non-decisively, that consciousness is gradual, not 
dichotomous. 
 Now this discussion supports the weak rich view cum postdiction 
because the view requires that consciousness is a gradual phenomenon. 
According to the view, when we fixate at the middle and are cued to report the 
upper row, the phenomenology for letters in the upper row will probably be as 
specific as one can get, i.e., specific in Block’s sense. The phenomenology for 
the middle row would be less specific, but given that it is around the fixation 
point, and it is not that far away from the cued row, it might still be possible to 
sustain reports to some extent. For the lower row, on the one hand it is not 
around the fixation, and on the other it is further away from the cued row, the 
visual phenomenology for it would be least specific, but still not purely generic, 
since it does not make sense to think that purely generic phenomenology, i.e., 
without any specificity, exists at all. Now, it is obvious that this view requires 
the gradational view of conscious experiences, since it involves talks such as 
‘most specific,’ ‘less/least specific,’ and so on. For the postdiction part, the 
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view says that attention can retrospectively makes a certain piece of 
phenomenology more specific, and again this requires the view the gradational 
view in question. 
 To conclude this chapter, let me restate what is supposed to establish 
here. The conclusion is not that Block’s version of rich view is rejected. Rather, 
it is a weaker view that given our understandings of the analogue character of 
visual experience and the functions of attention, Sperling’s case does not 
support Block’s version of the rich view. To get the argumentative structure 
clearer, we can restate Block’s rationales as follows: 
 
 I. If a row had been cued, participants would be able to report on it 
accurately. 
II. Introspectively, participants believe that they read off answers from 
residual phenomenology. 
III. It is legitimate to sum the results of partial reports across trials to 
establish the overall capacity of iconic memory. 
 
They are not supposed to be elements of a deductive argument, since as Block 
likes to say, his arguments for the rich view are always inference to the best 
explanation. So what we can do is to examine his rationales individually and 
see whether they do support Block’s view. Now I take it that I is 
uncontroversial; it is simply a factual description about participants’ 
performances in Sperling. III has been challenged by Phillips’s idea that 
attention retrospectively modulates our conscious percepts. I concur with this 
idea with some disagreement specified above. Now the key point of my 
argument so far is about II: there is no denying that the ‘reading off’ idea is 
what many participants think. But there are several complications here. For 
example, one may hold an error theory about it and say that participants 
massively misunderstand their own phenomenology. This is a possible view, 
but I tentatively side with Block that if there are other views available, error 
theories should be avoided. But even assuming that, there is a further question 
about how to understand this ‘reading off’ introspection. The hypothesis being 
put forward here is that after being cued, the relevant matching profiles 
become narrow enough to sustain accurate reports, so from participants’ point 
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of view they do read off answers from phenomenology. It is just that 
according to the current hypothesis what they read off is also what their 
attention helps modulate after being cued. This is quite different from Block’s 
view because in his picture, the matching profiles are independent of attention’s 
allocation. For Block, before the cue un-cued rows’ matching profiles look like 
this: 
 
 {E, E, E, E} 
 
That is, it is specific enough for reporting that it is letter ‘E,’ though perhaps 
remains neutral between different fonts. In the picture I argue for, the 
matching profiles of un-cued rows would be like this: 
 
 {E, E, E, E, F, F, F, F} 
 
That is, a given profile would not only neutral between different fonts of ‘E,’ 
but also other similar letters such as ‘F.’ 
So now we need to choose between these two hypotheses. Common to 
both hypotheses is the crucial reliance on certain notion of specific 
phenomenology. So the choice between them partially hinges on which 
hypothesis has a better worked-out and explanatorily powerful notion of 
specific phenomenology. In Block’s discussion, the description of specific 
phenomenology is only minimal. It did not appear in the original defence of 
the rich view, and was only introduced in response to objections. More 
importantly, the characterisation is not very helpful (‘of specific shapes…’). By 
contrast, the above discussion offers a substantive understanding of it with the 
notions of the analogue, matching profile, visual acuity, and so on. It coheres 
with the account of attention’s various functions, namely that attention can 
narrow down matching profiles in sensory discrimination. This is the main 
reason why I believe we should prefer the current account to Block’s. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
 
Visual Demonstratives 
 
4.1 Fixation and Peripheral Vision 
 
Visual demonstratives enter into the picture at this point because reports in the 
Sperling case require participants to think thoughts in the form of ‘that letter 
is…’ even though they do not have to do this explicitly. Now what is the 
relation between attention and visual demonstratives? In answering this 
question, we need to be clear which sense of attention is in play here. Consider 
the Sperling case again. After being cued, information pertaining to un-cued 
rows are still parts of one’s visual awareness, though not robust enough to 
sustain accurate reports. The cued row, instead, is not only selected, but also 
accessed in the sense that now we can use the relevant information to sustain 
accurate reports. We can think thoughts that involve visual demonstratives 
about letters both in the cued row and un-cued rows, though with different 
degree of specificity: with the cued row we can think ‘that letter is “E”,’ while 
it is harder to do so for letters in the un-cued rows.18 
 Issues concerning fixation point and peripheral vision are relevant here 
since they interact with attention: attention very often, though not always, goes 
with the fixation. It would help us understand more about these issues if we 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 In the previous chapter, we have identified selection, modulation and access as functions of 
attention. Modulation plays a crucial role there when we interpret Sperling’s result with 
postdiction. For the purposes of this chapter, selection and access will be more relevant. 
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think of its applications in different cases. For example consider the following 
two figures from Fred Dretske (2010): 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
Figure 2 
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Dretske believes that we consciously see ‘a lot of the detail’ (ibid.: 54), and he 
substantiates this claim by referring to our experiences to figure 1 and 2. This 
is a version of the rich view, since it says that we consciously see a great 
amount of details than we can attend at a given moment. Dretske asks readers 
to ‘look, for just a moment,’ at the figures he offers, and claims that ‘a quick 
glance (one or two seconds) is enough to see all the balls…’ (Dretske 2010: 59; 
my emphasis). There can be a premature objection that in this discussion, 
Dretske does not stipulate enough to sustain his case. For example, he does 
not say where we should fixate, and he is very relaxed about how long we see 
the two figures. Given these, the argument goes, the case does not differentiate 
Dretske’s view and versions of the sparse view such as Michael Tye (2010).19 In 
two seconds, we will have six to eight saccades, and we can do many voluntary 
eye movements if we want. Presumably, the reason why Dretske is so flexible 
about his descriptions is that he thinks even if we do it very quickly, we will 
still see much of the detail, but this causes a problem: Dretske provides 
absolutely no constraint on fixation points and where to direct one’s attention, 
and in two seconds we can see very much by moving our eyes and directing 
our attention. Given this flexibility, no wonder we see so much detail even 
when there are more than forty balls in front of us. What’s more, how far 
should we view the figures? Distance does matter; if you view these figures 
from, say, two feet away, the character of your experience will be very different 
from the experience you get when viewing it from five inches away. Given 
Dretske’s presumptions that we read the book from normal reading distance 
for two seconds, it might be fair to say that we see much of the detail, probably 
every ball. This is not controversial, but at the same time not very interesting: 
given that you have two seconds with no required fixation point, no wonder 
you can see all the details. Even a sparse theorist can agree with this. 
Now, this is a premature objection because it misunderstands what 
Dretske is aiming at here: he is describing an observation from daily life, i.e., 
when there is a group of items in front of us, we can very quickly see every one 
of them with quick glimpses. The premature argument is based on an 
uncharitable reading of Dretske. A more suitable understanding of the dialectic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 This premature argument is raised by myself in an earlier version of this chapter. 
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should be this. As Tye puts it, the two competing hypotheses are 
‘representational failure’ and ‘comparison failure’: 
 
[F]or at least some change blindness scenarios, we should accept the 
REPRESENTATIONAL FAILURE hypothesis at a conscious level as 
opposed to the COMPARISON FAILURE hypothesis at that level. The 
first hypothesis is self-explanatory; the second is the view that change 
blindness results not from a failure to see anything in the field of view 
but rather from a failure to compare properly conscious 
representations of the scene before and after the change (2010: 420) 
 
As Tye implies, there are different kind of change blindness scenario, and what 
he has in mind is the one shown by figure 1 and 2 above. His view is that we 
do not see the ball that is missing in figure 2 in most cases; Dretske’s view is 
that we do see it at least in some cases when we glimpse through the scene, and 
it is just that we fail to compare figure 1 and 2 in that regard. The opposition 
seems to be clear enough. However, here we risk talking past each other. As 
explained above, the fact that Dretske here does not stipulate a fixation point 
and so on shows that he is only registering an observation from daily life, 
namely that normally when there is a group of items in front of us, we can 
quickly skim through the scene and cover most of them. However, in Tye’s 
discussion, fixation and other related considerations are prominent. For 
example in illustrating his points he uses this figure: 
 
 
Figure 3 
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Here dots and crosses are used as fixations points and vertical lines are targets. 
It is fine in doing this, but we need to note that in doing so we are no longer 
dealing with the same kind of case. In Dretske’s original case, there is no 
regulation about fixation, while in Tye’s case there is. We can of course talk 
about different cases in discussions, but we need to note the differences 
between cases when we go along. Dretske can well agree that in figure 1 and 2, 
if we fixate at a point that is far enough from the crucial ball in the right, we do 
not see it. His view is that we do see it sometimes when we are allowed to 
glimpse through the entire scene, i.e., without fixation, even if afterwards we 
fail to identify the difference between the two figures. The distinction between 
two kinds of failure from Tye does make sense, but the application of them 
here can only be indirect, since there are two cases here, one with and the 
other without fixation. 
 For our topic here, i.e., the relation between attention and visual 
demonstratives, it is helpful to consider both cases. Let’s start from Dretske’s 
case that does not involve fixation. In this case, one runs through the scene and 
takes in most balls. Some balls will be foveated, some not, but being seen does 
not require being foveated. When seeing them, one can entertain a 
demonstrative thought employing, ‘this ball,’ directed to a given target. In 
doing so, one’s attention, both the selection and the access aspects, is operative: 
one needs to not only select the target, but also access it so that one can use the 
demonstrative in question to form beliefs about the target. When one sees that 
crucial ball in figure 1, one can also apply a demonstrative to it. But since it 
looks exactly the same as its fellows, there is no reason why one can identify its 
absence in figure 2. Perhaps sometimes we do by chance, but often we would 
not. Here we can say that it is a case of comparison failure, since even if one does 
see the crucial ball and form a demonstrative for it, one can still miss the 
difference in figure 2. In Tye’s case, in which we still have figure 1 and 2 in 
front of us, but with our eyes fixating at a point where it is far enough from the 
target, one cannot form a demonstrative thought about that crucial ball in 
figure 1, so the failure in question is a representational failure, i.e., one cannot 
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even see the crucial ball because it is too peripheral in one’s visual field.20 Since 
it is too peripheral, one cannot select it, let alone access it and conduct further 
rational acts. 
 Therefore, it seems that Tye’s objection to Dretske is a misfire: in 
Dretske’s case he allows viewers to skim through the scene by moving their 
eyes, while Tye stipulates that we fixate at some point. Unless Tye shows that 
Dretske’s way of describing the case is illegitimate for certain purpose, which 
he does not, we should simply acknowledge that they are different cases that 
might show different but perhaps consistent results. This leads us to think 
whether there is any interesting moral from this debate. I believe there is at 
least one, namely the importance of location of objects for visual 
demonstratives. In Dretske’s case, the fact that we need to move our eyes to 
see more balls shows that in some way location is quite important: locations 
are spatial properties and movement is a major way to track spatial properties. 
In Tye’s case, where viewers have to fixate at a point, they cannot see certain 
object, e.g., the crucial ball in Dretske’s figure, exactly because the location of 
that object is too peripheral in relation to the fixation. It seems that the 
importance of location for visual demonstratives is beyond doubt. The 
question is how crucial and in what way it is. 
 An effective way to approach this question is to examine an extreme 
view, e.g., the view that getting the target’s location right is necessary for applying 
visual demonstratives to it. John McDowell seems to hold this view when he 
writes: 
 
[W]hen a subject’s perceptual experience places an object for him, his 
statement ‘It’s over there’ (say) can count as expressing knowledge on 
his part of where in the world the object is, even if he is lost…This is 
what enables his thinking to home in on the object, in a way that 
depends directly on the object’s location in the objective world. 
(McDowell 1990: 257) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Here we assume, with Tye, a representational view of seeing for the sake of argument, but 
this assumption is not essential to our discussion here. 
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When McDowell writes ‘even if he is lost,’ it looks like the requirement is 
going to be very low. However, towards the end he asserts that the object’s 
location in the objective world is crucial, and this imposes a strong requirement for 
perceptual demonstratives: the subject has to get the object location correct in 
order to successfully apply perceptual demonstratives to it. This is as strong as 
one can get in this context: an object’s actual, correct location is essential to 
one’s ability to apply demonstratives to the target. This view of McDowell is 
inherited from his reading of Gareth Evans (1982) on information links. For 
our purposes I do not wish to enter into interpretative issues here. I propose 
we consider a straightforward objection from Peacocke that this view is 
implausible since it does not sit well with our ‘pre-theoretical intuition’ 
(1991:123-4). As he acknowledges, intuitions ‘can always be overruled by 
theory’ (ibid.: 124); the question is when we should prefer the intuition over 
the theory that is incompatible with it. In the present context, consider the case 
in which one clearly sees an object but does not get its location exactly right. Is 
there any reason to say that one thereby cannot apply demonstratives to it? It is 
not clear that there is. If one can mark the target out in one’s visual 
phenomenology, i.e., if one can differentiate it from its background, why can’t 
one apply visual demonstratives to it? When I get a person’s properties wrong, 
e.g., I misidentify someone’s gender, I certainly can keep track of the person 
visually. Applying visual demonstratives does not seem to require any stronger 
condition, such as getting the objective, correct location right.21 
 These considerations are relevant to our understanding of the Sperling 
case for this following reason. In the case in which one is cued to attend the 
upper row, although one would not be very good at reporting letters in un-
cued rows, especially the lower one, one would still be able to exercise visual 
demonstratives for letters one cannot report on, as long as one can roughly get 
their locations. Also, in the full report condition, in which participants just 
freely recall what they saw during the trials, they might be able to report 
accurately for roughly four letters, but get their locations seriously wrong. For 
example, they can correctly think ‘that letter is “K”,’ but misperceive or 
misremember its location. This further supports the more intuitive position 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Campbell argues for a view similar to mine (2002: 46). 
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that demonstratives do not require the subject to get the location of the target 
exactly right. 
 This ends what we need to say about the relation between visual 
demonstratives, attention, and the Sperling paradigm, amongst other things. 
There is a serious debate about whether attention is necessary for employing or 
understanding demonstratives, but in order to stick to the main line I bypass it 
for now. In next section I will explore another aspect of seeing. 
 
4.2 The Grain of Vision and Attention 
 
In order to understand what this additional aspect of seeing is and why it is 
relevant to the main line of this study, we need a small digression. In a similar 
but different debate, there is an issue concerning whether seeing is partially or 
even entirely conceptual. For those who argue for nonconceptual seeing, they 
often invoke the idea that seeing is rich or fine-grained in ways that our 
conceptual repertoire cannot capture. Now as Tye (2006) points out, we 
should carefully distinguish between the richness and the fineness-of-grain 
arguments. The former is about quantity, while the latter quality. The former 
argument is something like, ‘the quantity of information that is exhibited in 
vision is richer than that available in concepts.’ The latter argument, by contrast, 
should be something like ‘the quality of information that is exhibited in vision is 
finer than that available in concepts.’ For example, something can carry a huge 
amount of information (rich), but differences within those pieces of 
information might be very salient (not fine-grained), or the other way around. 
Richness and fineness-of-grain are different notions, so they constitute 
different argument against or for a certain view. 
 Now the topic of this essay is attention rather than conceptual thought, 
but these above notions are applicable to cases we are considering as well. First, 
in figure 1 and 2 we have a large number of balls for one to take in with a 
glimpse, but since it is obvious that they are all qualitatively identical, or at least 
close to identical, the fineness consideration does not apply. Secondly, the 
Sperling paradigm is often taken as a version of the richness argument, for 
example Tye (2006), Dretske (2006), and Block (2007b), but it is also related to 
the fineness consideration, since the letters can look quite similar to certain 
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other letters, but not that similar to some others. For example, as discussed 
above one’s phenomenology might be neutral between ‘E’ and ‘F,’ but it can 
clearly rule out ‘K.’ If the experience in question is even more specific, for 
example if participants are allowed to look at the stimuli for a longer duration, 
the visual phenomenology might be finer-grained so that it can decide between 
‘E’ and ‘F,’ but cannot do better, e.g., cannot differentiate between different 
fonts. Therefore the fineness-of-grain aspect of seeing is also important in 
understanding phenomenal specificity in the Sperling case, and more generally, 
visual knowledge. In the remainder of this chapter I will attempt to understand 
this notion. 
 Block (2012, 2013) provides good materials in this regard. Just like in 
his discussion of Sperling, his main concern is the relation between visual 
attention and consciousness. In this new pair of papers, he focuses on ‘the 
grain of vision and the grain of attention’ (2012: 170). By ‘grain’ he means 
‘minimal resolution’ or ‘minimal spatial areas’/‘windows of integration’ (ibid.: 
170-1; my emphasis). This is not exactly the same as what we mean by ‘grain’ 
above or in other contexts when philosophers talk about fineness-of-grain. For 
example, when Evans proposes his version of the argument, he writes: 
 
Do we really understand the proposal that we have as many colour 
concepts as there are shades of colour that we can sensibly discriminate? 
(Evans 1982: 229) 
 
In that case, what he has in mind are shades of colours: we can discriminate 
between some shades of colours, but without having any corresponding 
concept. This is different from what Block is engaging with, which is a spatial 
notion. However, we can regard both Evans’ case and Block’s case as special 
cases of grains, i.e., colour grains and spatial grains respectively. Both colour 
properties and spatial properties can be exhibited in vision, so we have 
corresponding notion of grains. Now for our purposes Block’s case is more 
relevant, since in understanding the Sperling case colours are out of question, 
but we should acknowledge that grains could have many kinds, though in the 
present context we will focus on spatial grain. I will come back to Evans’s 
dialectics in the next section. 
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 When Block introduces his notion of grain of vision, he contrasts it 
with ‘grain of attention,’ defined as follows:  
 
The minimal spacing (in terms of angle from the eye) at which subjects 
can do this reliably is called the grain of attention. (Block 2012: 174; my 
emphasis) 
 
By ‘this’ Block refers to the ‘stepping’ task concerning attention introduced by 
Patrick Cavanagh et al (2001). Block then continues: 
 
We could define a corresponding notion of grain of vision in terms of 
whether, in uncrowded fields, the subject can distinguish one dot from 
two dots, or whether the subject can detect a gap between two discs. 
(Block 2012: 174; my emphasis) 
 
To understanding these notions, we need to note that Block’s context here is 
crowding and peripheral vision, as he makes clear at the beginning of the 2013 
paper. This is most relevant to figure 3 above provided by Tye, where one is 
required to fixate at a point and try to pay attention to targets in one’s 
peripheral visual field. Tye’s view is that in that case we do not see certain bars 
individually, but only collectively. For Block to make his case, he needs a 
stronger view that we see a certain target individually, but cannot attend to it. 
How can we make this view plausible? 
 The issue hinges on which sense of seeing we should use here. 
Everyone should acknowledge that there are different senses of seeing and one 
can pick a certain sense for one’s purposes, but at the same time allows others 
to use difference senses for other purposes. Block points out that in seeing 
something, at least in a relatively tenuous sense, there is no need for one to be 
able to identify that thing (2012: 180). For example in trials in which the stimuli 
appear very shortly, one can fail to capture any interesting property of the 
target, and thereby fail to identify what the target is. However, it is still 
plausible to say that one sees the target, though not clearly at all, so that one 
cannot provide any further information about the target. To be sure, others 
can stipulate a thicker sense of seeing so that it requires identification for a 
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different purpose, but Block’s sense of seeing here, though tenuous, should be 
regarded as legitimate. 
 How about attention then? Block invokes the stepping task from 
Cavanagh et al (2001) to show that in cases such as figure 3, one can (tenuously) 
see an individual bar but fail to attend to it. In order to be more focused, I do 
not engage his argumentation here; instead I go back to where we started in 
this chapter, namely the distinction between selection and access. According to 
our usage, both selection and access are aspects of attention; they are different 
notions, but this does not automatically prevent them from being attention. 
Now in cases like figure 3, can average human subjects select or even access an 
individual bar in the middle with the fixation at the left? Let’s look at selection 
first. Recall that in our usage of selection, it is defined in information 
processing terms. Overall this fits better with the psychology literature. Now, 
in figure 3 the information about middle lines certainly go into observers visual 
systems; this is why people can detect whether there is incongruence amongst 
stimuli. However, people fail to mark it out in phenomenology and make use 
of it to report (e.g., I am now stepping to the third one), so they have no access 
to it in the sense defined above. This chimes well with our adoption of 
Campbell’s 2011 view, namely that selection goes with seeing. To have access 
to something is more demanding and therefore a further story. To keep clear 
about which sense of attention we are operating with is crucial in every step of 
our argumentation. 
 
4.3 Fineness of Grain 
 
In this final section, I briefly return to the fineness of grain consideration 
raised in Evans (1982), since it also helps us understand the nature of visual 
demonstratives. Here once again we encounter a debate between McDowell 
and Peacocke. In Mind and World, McDowell opens Lecture I by saying that 
‘[t]he overall topic I am going to consider in these lectures is the way concepts 
mediate the relation between minds and the world’ (1996: 3). For our purposes 
we do not need to enter the larger debate concerning what a theory of concept 
is supposed to do, e.g., whether we should avoid any circularity in the theory 
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(Postscript to Lecture III). I will focus on their disagreement in Lecture III 
concerning demonstrative concepts. McDowell introduces the context like this: 
 
One consideration that impresses Evans is the determinacy of detail 
that the content of experience can have. He claims that this detail 
cannot all be captured by concepts at the subject’s disposal. ‘Do we 
really understand the proposal that we have as many colour concepts as 
there are shades of colour that we can sensibly discriminate?’ 
(McDowell 1996: 56, quoting Evans 1982: 229) 
 
McDowell’s response to this involves his idea about demonstrative concepts: 
 
But why should we accept that a person’s ability to embrace colour 
within her conceptual thinking is restricted to concepts expressible by 
words like ‘red’ or ‘green’ and phrases like ‘burnt sienna’? It is possible 
to acquire the concept of a shade of colour, and most of us have done 
so. Why not say that one is thereby equipped to embrace shades of 
colour within one’s conceptual thinking with the very same 
determinateness with which they are presented in one’s visual 
experience, so that one’s concepts can capture colours no less sharply 
than one’s experience presents them? (McDowell 1996: 56-7) 
 
This ‘demonstrative concept’ strategy of course needs defence. ‘We can ensure 
that what we have in view is genuinely recognizable as a conceptual capacity if 
we insist that the very same capacity to embrace a colour in mind can in 
principle persist beyond the duration of the experience itself’ (ibid.: 57). 
McDowell calls this ‘recognitional capacity,’ which is ‘possibly quite short-lived’ 
(ibid.: 57). 
 McDowell’s strategy here is designed to cope with the objection that 
concepts are not as fine-grained as visual experiences are. However, he faces 
the opposite charge that ‘these demonstrative concepts slice too finely’: 
 
Consider ‘that shade,’ ‘that red,’ ‘that scarlet.’ These are all different 
conceptual contents. It seems to me [i.e., Peacocke] quite implausible 
	   76 
that just one of these, and not others, features in the representational 
content of experience of a shade of red. (Peacocke 1998: 382) 
 
Again, we are bracketing the question whether experiences possess 
representational content. The challenge remains. To this challenge we might 
reply, on McDowell’s behalf this time, as follows: it is true that there is no 
principled way to privilege any demonstrative concept, but for the purpose of 
capturing the grain of vision, we can simply use ‘that shade,’ or maybe ‘that 
colour.’ Individual perceivers can have finer concepts or not, but as along as 
they share the concept of ‘that colour’ that is fixed by the relation to the target, 
we do not need to worry about the opposite challenge raised by Peacocke. 
 Although I do not subscribe McDowell’s conceptualism, I find this 
aspect of his thought appealing. One might wonder that if I am in general 
agreement with McDowell with regard to answering the fineness of grain 
argument, how can I avoid his conceptualism? Here we need to make a 
distinction between characterising and constituting experiences. If concepts are 
not fine-grained enough to characterise experiences, it follows that they cannot 
constitute the contents or phenomenology of experiences. McDowell’s 
conceptualism requires the constitution claim, which entails the weaker 
characterisation claim. Now the fineness of grain argument targets the weaker, 
characterisation claim. Even if McDowell can satisfactorily answer that 
challenge, it does not thereby vindicate the constitution claim, because it is 
stronger (i.e., affirming the consequent cannot license us to affirm the 
antecedent). My view is that the fineness of grain argument does not refute the 
characterisation claim, as McDowell argues, but since I do not further accept 
the constitution claim, there is no commitment to conceptualism. 
 The view that demonstrative concepts can capture the grain of vision is 
closely related to some issues in epistemology. For example, there is a form of 
question that goes like this: given that experiences are so fine-grained/rich, or 
given that they are analogue in character, how do we account for their rational 
linkages to beliefs that are less fine-grained/rich or are digital in character? To 
argue that demonstrative concepts are fine-grained enough to capture 
experiences is the first step towards giving an account of epistemic, rational 
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linkages. This is a further step towards the larger project in the background, 
that is, understanding visual knowledge. 
 After digressing for a while, let me summarise the overall structure of 
the thesis. It starts with the observation that at least in many cases, the relation 
between perceptions to beliefs involves the transition from the imagistic to the 
propositional (Introduction). Sperling’s iconic memory partial report paradigm 
epitomises this transition. In order to understand what involves in the Sperling 
case, Block invokes a notion of specific phenomenology to sustain his view 
that what we are conscious of are richer than what we attend to at a given 
moment (the rich view). His characterisation of specific phenomenology, 
however, is unsatisfactory (Chapter 2). I propose that we invoke Peacocke’s 
notion of the analogue and other apparatuses to model this phenomenal 
specificity. In particular, the idea that perceptions are imprecise is captured by 
the notion of matching profile (Chapter 1). It is argued, with resources from 
Phillips, that attention can modulate matching profiles: attention can narrow 
down the ranges of matching profiles so that the phenomenology for the cued 
row becomes specific enough for accurate reports (Chapter 3). From this, to 
reach visual knowledge we need visual demonstratives to be operative (Chapter 
4). Since the narrative above is sometimes not very straightforward, the 
summary serves as a reminder about what we have covered in the thesis. 	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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
The Road Ahead 
 
C.1 Remaining Empirical Issues 
 
In the main body of the essay, in order to pave the way for the key notion 
‘matching profile’ and its application to the Sperling case, I spent most space 
motivating it and explaining how it works. In doing so, the engagement with 
what Block actually says concerning relevant empirical issues is minimal. In the 
first section here I discuss his follow-up ideas in the 2011 paper and explain 
how my position can cope with these new points. Also in that piece he 
discusses his opponents’ views, such as those from Stazicker and Phillips, so 
this also gives me a chance to compare my own view and theirs. 
 A key move in this paper is to draw a three-way distinction between 
kinds of visual short-term memory: 
 
 a) Rod-based pure iconic memory (lasting at most a few hundreds 
msecs) 
 b) Fragile VSTM (4-5 seconds) 
 c) Working memory 
 
This move takes us beyond the original Sperling experiment in that in the old 
paradigm item a and b are not kept apart. However, given that what Block and 
his opponents are interested is phenomenal consciousness, any rod-based 
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memory should be discarded. Kouider et al. (2010) uses a mask to do just that. 
In doing so, even with the assumption Block makes, i.e., we can sum reports in 
different trials, the result is still ‘only 1.47 out of 4 items in each row…not 
much above the capacity of working memory’ (Block 2011: 569). This is the 
main ground for Kouider et al. to deny the rich view. Block’s reply here is that 
‘the fragmentariness demonstrated may be due to the icon being diminished by 
low contrast stimuli and a mask’ (ibid.: 569). He prefers the method from Sligte 
et al. that uses ‘an isoluminant stimulus…since it is invisible to (color blind) 
rods, which are the main source of retinal persistence’ (ibid.: 569). The idea is 
that perhaps’ the mask used by the Kouider group wipe out not only retinal 
iconic memory but also some parts of fragile VSTM. To evaluate these 
methods goes beyond the scope of this essay, but in order to take issue with 
Block we may go with the method he prefers, i.e., the one offered by Sligte. 
What should we say about this three-way distinction and its relation to the 
original dialectic? 
 First, some might be sceptical about the entire discussion around 
Sperling. The scepticism goes like this: at least for Block’s aim, i.e., 
demonstrating that phenomenal consciousness is richer than access, Sperling’s 
case is useless because it crucially fails to differentiate retinal persistence from 
fragile VSTM. The entire discussion of Sperling between Block and his 
opponents is useless. In replying to this sceptical view, I would say that it goes 
too far. It is true that if what is at issue is between fragile VSTM and working 
memory, then any paradigm that fails to distinguish between fragile VSTM and 
retinal persistence would be non-ideal. However, from Block’s opponents’ 
point of view, if they could make the case against Block even with the Sperling 
paradigm, then they are indeed in a very good shape, since the Sperling 
paradigm conflates retinal persistence and fragile VSTM, which is good for the 
rich view. Therefore, the right conclusion to be drawn is that the discussion of 
Sperling is still useful, though both sides need to move onto new paradigms to 
make progress since those new paradigms seek to discard an irrelevant element 
– rod-based pure iconic memory. 
 The second point is related to the distinction between selection and 
access. Earlier we have noted that while psychologists often emphasise 
selection, philosophers talk more about access when theorising about attention. 
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This might due to the fact that philosophers are much more obsessed with 
knowledge and rationality, and access as they define it is more suitable for this 
epistemic purpose. Now, there is a danger of talking past each other here: 
psychologists also talk about a similar notion of access, but when they do so 
what they have in mind is often working memory, not attention. For example 
Bernard Baars’s global workspace theory of consciousness uses information 
accessed by working memory as the criterion for consciousness (1988). In this 
2011 paper, Block explicit sets up the dialectic with varieties of visual memories. 
If so, one might wonder whether we have changed the topic. But again I 
believe we can draw a more optimistic conclusion here. It is true that attention 
and working memory are different22, so if at the beginning the debate is about 
the former and now it is about the latter, we need to reconsider the dialectic. 
However, what is always at issue is access as Block and maybe Campbell define 
it. So there is a crucial point for disagreement. To identify access with attention 
is a further, and perhaps to some extent verbal move. What is crucial is to 
make clear what the disagreement is. If we stick to the notion of access as 
Block and Campbell define it, then we can still have the debate clearly in view. 
Finally and very briefly, above we stated with Block that fragile VSTM can last 
for 4-5 seconds, and if so it lends support for Block’s rich view. But we need 
to note that this point is from the Amsterdam group that Block always favours, 
so readers need to decide for themselves how much they buy into this result. 
 What is the main contention of this 2011 paper from Block? It is the 
idea that ‘the postulation of unconscious highly detailed iconic memory is 
unmotivated’ (ibid.: 574 
). In the paper he classifies his opponents into two groups, the ‘generic illusion’ 
and the ‘fragmentary illusion.’ This following formulation captures the cores of 
these two views: 
 
Generic Illusion: ‘generic consciousness combined with unconscious 
iconic memory’ (ibid.: 568) 
Fragmentary Illusion: fragmentary consciousness combined with 
unconscious iconic memory. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Alan Allport (2011) has pointed out the empirical difficulty in teasing apart this pair of 
notions, but still, at least they are conceptually distinct. 
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There can be several complications here. For example, even for those who are 
classified as holding one view, say generic illusion, there is still room for 
debating about the nature of being generic. The same goes for the other 
hypothesis. Stazicker (2011) explicitly holds the generic version, while it is 
more difficult to classify Phillips’s view (2011). However, they share the view 
that it is unconscious iconic memory that sustains people’s cognitive performances. 
And this is where my view crucially different from theirs. Here I partially side 
with Block that ‘[t]here has been one direct test of the power of unconscious 
working memory…[by Soto et al. which] suggests it is too weak to explain the 
memory of up to 5 oriented rectangles for up to 4-5 seconds in the Amsterdam 
paradigm’ (Block 2011: 573-4). My endorsement of this is only partial because 
as discussed above, there might be question about the Amsterdam group’s 
result. But at least it shows that unconscious memory might not be as powerful 
as some theorists have thought. This echoes with Block’s complaint towards 
the end of that paper that some tend to think that hypotheses invoking 
unconscious memory seem to have certain default status (ibid.: 574), but it is 
not clear this should be the case. In this crucial aspect, my own position is 
closer to Block’s in that before the cue, consciousness has a higher capacity 
than access. 
 However, there is another aspect that my view is more similar to 
Phillips’s. It is the idea that Sperling’s case might involve postdiction. I believe 
Phillips (2011) has made a convincing case for its initial plausibility, as we have 
reviewed in Chapter 3. Stazicker (2011) denies that he shares this view by 
saying that ‘[his] interpretation doesn’t require any retroactive effect of attention 
on conscious experience’ (169), but for one thing, ‘doesn’t require’ does not 
mean that it is actually not the case; for another, given that the cue comes in 
only after the stimuli offset, it is not clear how he can prevent a certain version 
of the postdiction interpretation. Very often when I present my view on these 
matters, people ask how different my view is from Stazicker (2011) and Phillips 
(2011). To the extent that they hold postdiction for the Sperling case (though 
Stazicker would deny this), my view is in the same camp with theirs. But as 
stated above, the crucial difference is that while they hold that what is really 
doing the work is unconscious iconic memory, I side with Block that 
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consciousness might do more works in this regard. Again my view is that 
before the cue participants have analogue phenomenology with larger 
matching profiles, say neutral between ‘E’ and ‘F’ in one location, but after the 
cue attention retrospectively or postdictively narrows down the profile so that 
now it can sustain accurate reports for the identity of the letter in question. It is 
postdiction, but what attention does in my picture is not bringing unconscious 
information into consciousness; rather the change happens at the conscious 
level: the wider matching profiles are conscious in the first place. 
 There are many empirical issues that have been raised and discussed on 
this topic, both by Block and by others, that I cannot cover in this essay. But I 
believe the above discussion should be minimally enough to differentiate my 
view from others so that readers may find it easier to keep track of the fine 
structure of the dialectic. In section 2 I continue this line by briefly discussing 
some empirical issues concerning discrimination and just noticeable difference. 
 
C.2  Analogue Magnitude and Supervaluation 
In cashing out how the notion of matching profile can help us understand the 
Sperling experiment, one notion of analogue is invoked to construct the model. 
In that discussion I mentioned that there is a root of that line of thought in 
psychology, but I did not go into the details in that area due to the space limit. 
This can be another future direction. One example comes from animal studies. 
A study conducted by Mark Rilling and Colin McDiarmid (1965) on pigeon’s 
number sense in instructive. The general result is that pigeons are quite reliable 
in discriminating the numerical values of two sequences of pecks until the ratio 
exceeded 9:10. Later similar results are shown in different species, including 
human infants (Xu and Spelke 2000). These discriminative capacities obey 
‘Weber-Fechner Law,’ which says that the just noticeable difference between 
two stimuli is proportional to the magnitude of the stimuli, i.e., the ability to 
discriminate two magnitudes is a function of their ratio. The discussions and 
applications of this law in psychology have been well established, but exactly 
how we can extend it to my view of Sperling in not entirely clear. One 
complication is, again, how we understand the relevant notion of analogue here. 
‘Analogue magnitude’ in the psychology literature does not match what many 
philosophers mean by ‘analogue.’ For example, Lewis (1971) suggests that 
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analogue representations should be primitive in the language of physics, but 
according to the psychological usage, nothing like this constraint is required. 
Similar holds true of Dretske’s and Goodman’s notions. In drawing 
connections to the empirical literatures, it is crucial to make sure that we do 
not talk past to one another. This is one crucial step in this project, but it goes 
beyond the scope of this piece.23 
 Another possible connection in this regard is vagueness and 
supervaluation in philosophical logic. More specifically, the idea of 
supervaluation is a response to the ‘sorites paradox.’ Basically it reflects a 
certain kind of indeterminacy concerning applications of predicates that lack 
precise boundaries, such as ‘being bald’: it is not clear that there is a 
determinate answer to the question whether a specific person is bald given the 
amount of that person’s hair. This vagueness phenomenon is arguably one of 
the thorniest problems in philosophical logic and philosophy of language. 
Although it is not obvious, there might be some relevance to theories of 
perception. Here we discuss only one response to vagueness, namely 
supervaluationism. We can trace the idea back to Bas van Fraassen (1966), with 
later developments by Michael Dummett (1975) and Kit Fine (1975). One of 
the most salient characters of this approach is non-bivalent logic, i.e., logic 
with more than two values (typically true and false). To say this is a semantic 
view of vagueness is to contrast it with other views, such as the epistemic 
conception, which has it that vagueness in a significant sense not real 
(Williamson 1994). The semantic view confronts the problem by semantic 
analysis: one crucial question here is that the predicate in question neither 
definitely applies nor definitely does not apply, and the view offers a semantic 
analysis to ‘definitely.’ Roughly, the objects that the predicate definitely applies 
fall in its positive extension, while the objects that the predicate definitely does 
not apply fall in its negative extension. The remaining ones are borderline cases, 
and they fall under the predicates’ penumbra, i.e., cases in which the predicate in 
question is neither true nor false. Now, supervaluationists invoke a notion of 
‘super-truth’: ‘if every way of making a valuation more precise by dividing up 
the borderline cases between the positive extensions and the negative 
extensions results in a fully precise valuation in which the sentence comes out 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 For a more substantive discussion of these issues, see Beck (2012). 
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true, then that sentence is supertrue’ (Barker 2005: 9-10). The opposite can be 
said to ‘superfalse.’ This is roughly how supervaluationism goes about in 
explaining vagueness. 
 Now how does this bear on perception? Recall that the very idea of 
matching profile involves a range of magnitude, such as length, size, and so on. 
It is argued that it is analogue in character because unlike many beliefs, which 
are digital in being either true or false, every case of perception seems to be 
imprecise by their very nature: most cases are quite close to veridical, but 
perhaps never perfectly veridical given the human discriminatory capacities are 
imprecise. If this is so, the matching profile model of perception seems to echo 
what supervaluationism has to say about vague predicates. It is helpful to think 
this way because in saying that perception are vague, indeterminate, or 
imprecise, one wants to have a model to substantiate the claim in question, 
otherwise the claim, even if true, might turn out to be quite vacuous. 
Supervaluationism is a well-developed theory of vagueness. There is a question 
about whether it is true in the case of language, and even if so, whether there is 
any interesting application to perception. This present inquiry does not provide 
answers to these difficult questions, but this seems to be yet another interesting 
future direction for us to pursue.24 
 
C.3 Rationality 
In this final section, I briefly discuss the final step towards an understanding of 
visual knowledge, the larger project in the background. Just to rehearse the 
disclaimer, I do not here commit to the view that beliefs plus rational 
entitlement are sufficient for knowledge. There are other possible elements, 
such as avoidance of epistemic luck. But it is safe to assume that entitlement 
must somehow play certain role in the formation of knowledge. It is part of 
the very idea of knowledge. Otherwise it is difficult to distinguish knowledge 
from mere true beliefs. 
 It is a tempting idea that a function of consciousness is to facilitate 
rationality in some sense. Consider blindsight again. Intuitively, the key 
difference between patients with blindsight and normal perceivers is that they 
lack awareness in the blind fields, and that explains why it is only normal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 For a recent effort in this regard, see Perkins and Bayne (2013). 
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perceivers who are entitled to the claim of knowledge. There may be 
something true about this picture, but it cannot be this easy. There has been 
powerful scepticism about linking consciousness and rationality in this way, for 
example from David Rosenthal (2008). In this section I evaluate this 
scepticism. 
 Rosenthal first registers the reason why the idea that rationality is a 
function of consciousness looks so compelling: 
 
Because the consciousness of thinking and perceiving is subjectively 
central in our lives, it is intuitively inviting to assume that their being 
conscious has some significant function. (2008: 831; my emphasis) 
 
However, he has a principled argument against any such idea.25 
 
The rationality of thoughts and desires is a matter of their intentional 
content. Rational thoughts and desires have intentional content that 
reflects rational connections among those states, and with behavior and 
the environment as the organism perceives it. These connections are 
both necessary and sufficient for the relevant thoughts and desires states to 
be rational. They are what rationality consists in. (ibid.: 832; my 
emphasis) 
 
This argument is not without its initial plausibility. Consider a historical 
observation of 20th century analytic philosophy: when philosophers such as 
Donald Davidson (1984) theorised about meaning and rationality, 
consciousness was very often left out of the picture. Even for those like 
Dennett who work both on content and consciousness, the discussions of 
them are by and large separate. For example consider the idea that only the 
intentional stance can help us understand a creature’s rational behaviours 
properly (1989). In that discussion, consciousness does not play any significant 
role. It seems that the rationale that underlies these approaches is something 
like the argument epitomised in the passage from Rosenthal, i.e., the idea that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Rosenthal also invokes some empirical studies to back up his position. To look at those and 
other related studies would take us too far afield, so here I only discuss his conceptual 
argument. 
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inferences are between semantic relations that are exhausted by semantic 
contents. On this picture, consciousness is simply irrelevant. 
 What I want to challenge about this picture is the sufficiency claim, i.e., 
semantic relations or connections are sufficient for rationality. Consider an 
uncontroversial point that people usually if not always hold beliefs that are 
inconsistent with one another. To remedy the situation, we need to bring them 
into the person’s purview and explain why there are inconsistencies involved. 
Semantic rules do not work like physical laws: in the physical domain, it is the 
case that for medium-sized objects, they cannot occupy the same location at 
the same time. This governs the physical domain automatically without being 
monitored by any agent. But it works differently when it comes to intentional 
contents. It is true that there are objective relations between those contents that 
are subject to normative rules and are independent of consciousness, but they 
govern only what should happen, not what actually happens. At least sometimes, 
consciousness needs to come in to put target beliefs on the table so that we 
can think about them explicitly. Rosenthal is right in arguing that 
consciousness is actually much less important than most people expect, but his 
position turns out to be too strong. At least under certain circumstances, 
consciousness can do something for us concerning rationality. 
 Rationality, knowledge and epistemology in general are very relevant to 
the current project but there is no space for me to develop my views on this 
occasion. Here are two possible developments. The first is to consider 
Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument (2000). His definition of ‘luminosity’ in 
the relevant sense is this: 
 
A condition is luminous means ‘whenever it obtains (and one is in a 
position to wonder whether it does), one is in a position to know that it 
obtains. (2000: 13) 
 
Williamson’s target here is the view that ‘one is always in a position to know 
whether one is in them’ (ibid.: 13), and he calls this target ‘accessibility 
requirement’ (ibid.: 13; my emphasis). If we apply this to phenomenology, his 
target becomes the view that whenever a mental episode or state is 
phenomenal, the subject is in a position to know that it obtains. Now, perhaps 
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my view is immune to this threat anyway, since I accept the distinction 
between selection and access, and I do not hold that whatever selected in 
experience is accessed, even assuming that what we mean by ‘access’ is similar 
enough to Williamson’s meaning, my view does not commit to the idea that 
one is always in a position to know whether one is in those mental states. Still, 
it seems to be relevant enough so that if there is more room, it can be a 
direction of exploration. 
 The other direction is the relation to McDowell’s discussion of the 
Myth of the Given (Sellars 1956, McDowell 1996). Basically, it seems to be 
quite relevant because McDowell explicitly classifies any version of non-
conceptualism into the Myth of the Given, and if so my current view lies into 
the camp as well. The Given theorists hold that experiences are confined in the 
realm of law, which is different in kind from the space of reasons, but they still 
want experiences to do rational works for us. Here I tend to agree with 
McDowell that this is indeed a view one wants to avoid. However it is a further 
claim that the space of reason is co-extensive with the space of concept 
(McDowell 1996). The Myth of the Given, as such, does not speak to issues 
about concepts. Therefore in acknowledging that the current picture is a 
version of non-conceptualism, we do not thereby fall prey to the Myth of the 
Given. As Peacocke observes, ‘[i]t is an additional thesis, incorporated into the 
formulation of the Myth of the Given in Sellars, McDowell, and Brandom, that 
all representational content is conceptual content’ (2010: 191; my emphasis). 
That additional thesis might turn out to be true, but it needs additional 
arguments. Therefore I believe that as it stands, the current picture of visual 
knowledge avoids the Myth of the Given at least on the face of it.26 
 I shall end this essay here. The major topic of it, again, is phenomenal 
specificity. Block’s notion ‘specific phenomenology’ is invoked to sustain his 
interpretation of the Sperling paradigm. In Chapter 1 and 2 I have tried to 
explain why his position is no good and we need to use the analogue and 
matching profile to have a better understanding of phenomenal specificity. 
Chapter 3 moves on to attention and argues that under suitable circumstance 
attention can postdictively narrow down matching profiles. Chapter 4 further 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 In the previous version of the thesis I have fuller discussions of both Williamson 
and McDowell, but for practical reasons in this final version I keep the discussions of 
them minimal. 
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discusses other aspects of phenomenal specificity by considering different 
cases. Now in this conclusion I attempt to discuss some future research 
directions, including empirical, linguistic, and epistemic ones. They are 
unsatisfactory by nature: after all, they are directions for future researches. 
However, I hope this way of ending the essay can show that the concern of 
phenomenal specificity has much larger impact and relevance than it might 
originally seem. 
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The essay is a study of phenomenal specificity. By ‘phenomenal’ here we mean conscious 
awareness, which needs to be cashed out in detail throughout the study. Intuitively, one 
dimension of phenomenology is along with specificity. For example it seems appropriate 
to say that one’s conscious awareness in the middle of the visual field is in some sense 
more specific than the awareness in the periphery under normal circumstances. However, 
it is difficult to characterise the nature of phenomenal specificity in an accurate way. This 
essay seeks to do just that. 
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